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ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET OF THE SOVIET UNION
SERGEI G. GORSHKOV
AN OPERATIONAL CODE AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Michael William Cramer

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THESIS

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
Sergei G. Gorshkov
An Operational Code and Thematic Analysis

by

Michael William Cramer

March 1975

Thesis Advisor:

E.J. Laurance

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Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
Sergei G. Gorshkov
An Operational Code and Thematic Analysis

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., University of Washington, 1967

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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I. INTRODUCTION

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, has likened him to a "20th century Russian Mahan, an articulate advocate of seapower as a vital--indeed indispensable--attribute of great power status (114:70)." The British magazine The Economist has observed that "the number of great admirals is small," but they have included him in that number by comparing him to a "modern day John Fisher (115:3)." Norman Polmar, a noted maritime analyst, speaks of him with the likes of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz (116:199). Vice Admiral J. F. Calvert, USN, refers to his durability and consummate political skills: "Through Stalin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev, the nimble admiral has remained at the helm (117:57)." Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, has written "Under his leadership, the Soviet Navy has been elevated to an equal component of the Armed Forces and most probably will soon be considered the premier service among the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces (118:63)." And so the benediction and veneration by Western naval commentators continues. But who is this man of whom they speak? Who is Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov? What manner of man has been able to transform the Soviet Navy from a meek, coastal defense force into its present position as prime challenger for world ocean supremacy? What are Admiral Gorshkov's goals for his navy, and what are his perceptions

of the political arena? How far will the Admiral go in pursuing his objectives, and what are his plans for the future?

In examining these questions--if the investigation is to be more than a literary, intuitive exercise-- a clear, systematic construct must be developed which facilitates prediction and explanation (119:3). The operational code system is such a construct. This system, utilizing content analysis, allows the researcher to fulfill investigative requirements on two levels: substance and methodology. Substance is important because Gorshkov must be analyzed through his words and communications. The results of this analysis will be correlated with past and extrapolated to future substantive matters. Methodology is vital so that a broad, diverse data base may be systematically and objectively scrutinized in a manner which can be replicated in future studies involving other important political/military elites.

This thesis is divided into nine sections. Part I. is the introduction. Part II. defines the nature of the problem by: 1) delineating the controlling purpose, and 2) explaining the importance of the inquiry. Part III. is an exposition of the methodological tools of the research: the operational code construct and content analysis. Part IV. investigates the data from which the code was constructed, and from which the most significant themes were extracted: the data represents some 113 separate documents in total.

Part V. is an exhibit of the primary results of the research: Admiral Gorshkov's operational code. This section also displays a summary of the code, lists important limitations of the operational code construct, and outlines areas for further methodological research. Part VI. presents a "macro" examination of the 50 most significant themes of the Gorshkov material. This section provides a general statistical analysis, whereas Part VIII. illustrates similar information on a discrete theme basis. Part VII. predicts future Soviet action based upon: 1) the results of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code, and 2) a systematic, thematic analysis of the Admiral's 50 most consistent public topics. This section is perhaps the most interesting part of the thesis, albeit controversial. Part VIII. contains appendices. Appendix A lists the 50 most significant themes derived from the Gorshkov data. Important background information, statistical analyses, and representative quotations are included for each of the main theme categories. Appendix B is an exposition of the coder reliability test that was utilized in this research. Part IX. lists footnote and selected bibliographic information.

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A. CONTROLLING PURPOSE

The central thrust of this thesis explores the utility and relevance of employing the operational code construct on a contemporary Soviet military figure who is involved in the Soviet decision-making process. The results of such a code should clearly identify the subject's perception of political life, as well as determining the limiting bounds of the most probable means which the subject would select in pursuing his political goals.

If one is to truly understand an elite figure such as Admiral Gorshkov, then one must analyze his decision process through an investigation of his philosophic and instrumental beliefs systems. The operational code construct provides a very systematic method for performing such a task.

B. IMPORTANCE OF INQUIRY

Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN, perceptively commented that the "Navies in War and Peace" series "caught" his attention because "in this series of articles by Admiral Gorshkov, we have a rare glimpse into the mind of a very important man. It is not a complete psycho-intellectual analysis, not a blueprint, but a glimpse into a mind....The most important element of intelligence in any adversary situation....is some degree of insight into the mind of the opponent (120:68)." This quotation crystalizes the vital

importance of knowledge of one's opponent; knowledge not only of his capabilities, but also knowledge of his goals and intentions.

Captain Robert B. Bathurst, USN, in an article prepared for the Naval War College Review, also spoke of the importance of divining the intention of the opponent. He criticized the analytical direction of such time-worn methodologies as technological forecasting and its contemporary running-mates net-assessment and functional analysis (122:16-27). The Captain did not deride these systems of analysis per se, but rather indicated that analysts have tended to emphasize hardware to the exclusion of intentions. He contends that such an approach often misses the real issues. It only addresses one half of the question.

Captain Bathurst's criticism is well founded, but such criticism does not ease the dilemma of the analyst. As one moves away from technological forecasting toward political predictions, forecasting accuracy is reduced. The analyst is faced with the dilemma of predicting important questions of intent with low accuracy, or projecting less important hardware evolutions with a high degree of confidence. The prediction of goals and intentions is always more challenging and interesting than forecasting hardware capabilities, but the tools of political prediction are not nearly so refined as their technological counterparts.

The primary goal of good intelligence is providing consumers with the best, most precise evaluation possible

of the future status, capabilities, and political intentions of foreign powers (121:157). The importance of understanding the intentions of Soviet policymakers is self-evident, but the selection of the most effective means of obtaining that understanding is not so obvious.

Historically, the US intelligence community has studied Soviet policymakers via the intelligence profile. These profiles are a synthesized summary of biographic data, attache comments, and defector reports. Intelligence profiles can be a very effective tool, and often solve parts of the dilemma posed by Captain Bathurst, but profiles are handicapped in three critical areas. First, intelligence profiles are written appraisals of documented facts. As such, profiles often present Soviet leaders in two dimensions, facts and numbers, but do little to grasp that third dimension which is so important in Soviet decisions: the subject's perception of political life. Second, analytical preconceptions often project American attitudes onto the Soviet psyche as if the Soviets lacked originality. The old approach of "We make decisions in this manner, so if the Soviets are 'rational' then they must too..." is all too often present. Third, intelligence profiles discount propaganda. But as Captain Bathurst observes "even propaganda tells us a considerable amount about how men think (122:17)."

The operational code system fills in the gaps and avoids many of the pitfalls of intelligence profiles. The code provides insight into the subject's perception

of political life. The code construct, if applied objectively, rejects analytical preconceptions. Finally, the operational code sets forth an excellent typology for the content analysis of public propaganda statements.

Nathan Leites first employed the operational code in examining the psyche of Soviet decision-makers in his landmark effort, The Operational Code of the Politburo. In this effort, Leites rigorously defined the motives and nuances of the inputs to the Politburo's decision process. The content of the Leites' code was drawn exclusively from the writings of Lenin and Stalin--including propaganda. In 1967, Alexander George formulated a structure for the Leites code. The operational code methodology has been widely applied to American political figures (e.g. Secretaries of State Dulles and Rusk, Senators Fullbright and Church, etc.), but the code has not been applied to a contemporary military figure.

Admiral Gorshkov presents a particularly appealing example for such an investigation for several reasons. First, the Admiral occupies a prominent position bridging the two policymaking centers of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, he is a Deputy in the Ministry of Defense of the Council of Ministers; on the other, he is a full voting member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Second, he is closely allied with prestigious members of the Politburo. Third, as regards the Navy, if any single individual can be tapped as

the prime mover of Soviet naval expansion, it is Sergei Gorshkov. It has been Gorshkov, 65, who has guided the growth of the Navy as its Commander-in-Chief for the past 19 years. He has totally reshaped the Soviet Union's naval strategy, and has transformed the fleet into the most flexible arm of Soviet foreign policy. Finally, due to his demonstrated ability, unprecedented military tenure, and high Party connections, Admiral Gorshkov has assumed the position as preeminent spokesman and prophet for Soviet sea power. The operational code of a military strategist so close to the center of Soviet policy decisions should be a useful tool indeed.

The importance of developing an operational code for Admiral Gorshkov may be summarized as follows: 1) the operational code construct provides insight into problems heretofore unavailable through other methods of analysis; 2) the operational code provides a means of fathomming the perceptions of Gorshkov the man, the role that he has set for the Soviet Navy, and the bounds of the means which he would employ in pursuing those goals; 3) the operational code can serve as a useful tool in forecasting future Gorshkov decisions; and 4) to the extent that the application of the operational code methodology is successful in the Gorshkov case, then the same methods might find broader application within the intelligence community at large.

III. METHODOLOGY

The explanation of the methodological approach of this thesis is divided into two parts: 1) an analysis of the operational code system as formulated by Nathan Leites, categorized by Alexander George, and applied to Sergei Gorshkov, and 2) the rationale for the use of content analysis and its application in this research project.

A. THE OPERATIONAL CODE

1. Nathan Leites' Contribution

The operational code concept was formulated first by Nathan Leites in 1951 in his scholarly book, The Operational Code of the Politburo. Leites continued his work in the behavioral approach to the study of political elites in 1953 with A Study in Bolshevism. Both books advanced the operational code as "a set of general beliefs about fundamental historical issues and central questions as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action (123:191)." Leites stated that "The intention is not to discuss the major theories of Leninism-Stalinism but to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political conduct (124:xi)." Both of Leites' books were advances over the biographic profiles of his day which did not illuminate political orientations, the style of decision calculations, or the behavioral premises of the subjects in question. These same shortcomings are present in most intelligence profiles today.

The operational code provided a breakthrough in methodology; the code was a new and original analytic tool. The content of The Operational Code of the Politburo elicited a far-reaching analysis of the Politburo. Prior to 1951, much had been written about Soviet military might and Communist philosophy, but little had been written about the guiding force of the Soviet Union: the Politburo. The Leites books synthesized general Politburo beliefs about fundamental political issues as they bore upon foreign policy calculations. The content of the Politburo code was derived from a thematic analysis of the quotations of Lenin, Stalin, and documented accounts of Politburo action. Leites formulated a set of themes or rules (code) which the Politburo/Bolsheviks believed to be essential to political action.

The comparison between the tasks which faced Nathan Leites and the tasks which face this thesis follow:

- 1) Leites studied the guiding force of Soviet society, and this thesis investigates the guiding force of the Soviet Navy; 2) much has been written and predicted concerning the capabilities of the Soviet Navy, but much less has been written about the intended use of Soviet sea power or its motivating forces; 3) Leites endeavored to determine those factors which shaped the "prism" through which the Politburo's perception of reality was focused, and this thesis examines these same factors as they apply to Admiral Gorshkov;

4) the content of the Leites code was written communication-- the content of the Gorshkov code is extracted from the Admiral's communications and public addresses from 1955-1974; 5) the Gorshkov code, like that of the Politburo, is a study of the rules which its subject believes to be essential to political action.

An attractive feature of the operational code methodology is that it bridges the gap of time and leadership. Leites concluded, for a variety of reasons, that an elites' fundamental political beliefs are resistant to change. Therefore, once Admiral Gorshkov's code has been developed carefully, the code will be modified only after a great deal of time, or by a particularly traumatic experience.

The shortcomings of the Leites system are as follows: 1) Leites did not structure his code in a clear manner and, as a result, relationships between certain variables in his code are obscure; and 2) the order and heirachy of the Leites code is not stated clearly. Alexander George corrected these shortcomings.

2. Alexander George's Classification Scheme

In 1967, Alexander George, of Stanford University, devised a classification scheme based upon the two Leites books. George set forth his construct in an International Studies Quarterly article entitled "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." George sought to synthesize and amplify

the relationships between issues and postulates fundamental to the Leites code. George delineated a system of "philosophic and instrumental beliefs" which were critical to the decision process of political activity.

Alexander George recognized that the operational code was not the total answer to the study of the decision process, but rather that the code represented a significant portion of the inputs to that process. "A political leader's beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his view regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics--whether these beliefs be referred to as 'an operational code,' 'Weltanschauung,' 'cognitive map,' 'or an elite's political culture'--are among the factors influencing the actor's decisions. The operational code is a particularly significant portion of the actor's entire set of beliefs about political life (123:197)." George did go on to add that a comprehensive model of decision-making would also consider the actor's ethical and normative beliefs. But when you deal with Communist figures, their ethical and normative beliefs are so tied to their philosophic belief system, as to be indistinguishable from it.

George, like Leites, developed an actor's operational code through the use of content analysis of the actor's responses to a set of questions relating to his philosophic and instrumental belief systems. The code is a reading of the acceptable limits of an actor's

responses to a given event in the present or future derived from his consistent responses to similar past events. According to George, an elite's "answers" to such philosophical and instrumental (ends-means) questions "can help the researcher and policy planner to 'bound' the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action (123:200)."

In short, the explanation and prediction of leadership behavior are improved by understanding the leader's political beliefs. The researcher or policy planner will still be unable to predict with confidence the precise behavior of the subject in any specific circumstance, but he will have an excellent idea of the range of choices which are acceptable to the subject in a decision situation. Further, if one were to "smooth" predictions about a given subject over an extended period of time, then the researcher could predict "average" or mean behavior with a high degree of certainty.

Admiral Gorshkov's code is formulated using the George construct as its organization model. The Gorshkov code is composed of two parts: 1) his philosophic belief system which consists of the assumptions and premises he has made regarding the nature of politics, the role of the individual in history, the image of the opponent, etc.--in short, a summary of how firmly he has embraced the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and 2) his instrumental

belief system which consists of the "answers" that he has developed to ends' means relationships--e.g. how are goals pursued? What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action? Etc.--in short, what are the optimum means to be utilized in pursuing political objectives?

a. The Philosophic Content of Gorshkov's Operational Code

1) What is Gorshkov's view of political life?

Does he view the political universe as one of harmony or conflict? How does he perceive the fundamental character of the United States? Its navy?

a) Does he embrace Marx's concept of dialectical materialism?

b) Does he believe as Lenin that imperialism is the highest form of capitalism and the most serious threat to Communism?

c) Does he view US leadership as corrupt and hostile from top to the bottom? What about its military leadership?

d) Are the capitalists determined to annihilate Communism? Can there be any "middle ground" between total Communist victory or total defeat?

e) Have Gorshkov's views been modified over time? Have his views changed with changes in Party leadership?

2) What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and

aspirations? Can Gorshkov be optimistic or pessimistic on this score?

a) Will Communism eventually triumph?

Worldwide?

b) Is catastrophe an ever-present danger?

What is the role of the Party in avoiding the realization of catastrophe?

3) Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

a) Does Gorshkov accept the determinist approach of Marxism?

b) Is there a timetable for political action?

c) What is the role of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) in the interpretation of history? Can intelligent, well-calculated action on the part of the Party "hurry" history along?

4) How much control or mastery can one have over historical development?

a) Does Gorshkov believe that dedicated political actors can move history?

b) What is the role of the Party in regards to the "production" and education of such actors?

c) As a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, how does Gorshkov view his own responsibilities with respect to the advancement of the Communist cause?

5) What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

a) Does Gorshkov believe that all politically

important events are explainable by the laws of Marxism-Leninism? Is his belief a formality or a reality?

b) If Gorshkov minimizes the role of chance in human affairs, does he believe that there should be a continuing plan for the development of Communism in general and Soviet naval science in particular?

c) What is the danger of muddling through?

The "answers" that Gorshkov gives to the questions listed above will reflect his philosophic belief system concerning politics in general and naval matters in particular. This set of beliefs, in turn, operates as the foundation for his instrumental beliefs which refer more specifically to the key aspects of knowledge and action: e.g. ends-means relationships.

b. The Instrumental Beliefs of Gorshkov's
Operational Code

1) What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

a) Does Gorshkov believe in the minimax strategy?

b) Does Gorshkov believe in pursuing an optimizing strategy, or rather a protracted, graduated system of objectives? Has he applied either of these strategies in developing the Soviet Navy? Should uncalculated adventures be avoided?

c) Does Gorshkov believe in the Soviet policy of democratic centralism? How does Gorshkov view the primacy of the Politburo in naval matters?

d) How does Gorshkov view programs which could achieve short range gains to the delay of long range victory?

2) How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

a) Should naval goals be pushed to the limit? What meaning does this have in naval warfare and in the international mission of the Soviet navy? Should the enemy be annihilated or allowed to exist?

b) Are enemy concessions a sign of weakness?

c) How far should Gorshkov push naval expansion within the Soviet Armed Forces? What are the political limits to naval prestige within the Soviet military heirarchy?

d) Is retreat ever a viable option in military conflict? In political conflict?

3) How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

a) Does Gorshkov favor any behavior which could ultimately provoke the annihilation of the Communist Party? What about political action which could jeopardize the position of the Soviet Navy?

b) Does Gorshkov believe that major goals can be pursued with limited means? If not, what are his beliefs in this matter? What does he think about the escalation of local wars into nuclear conflict?

4) What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

a) Does Gorshkov favor procrastination or precipitous action? Or neither?

b) Does Gorshkov favor riding the crest of the moment, or continually advancing his causes at every opportunity?

c) How does Gorshkov view individual initiative?

d) If nuclear war begins, should the Soviets initial reaction be limited? Is the first stage of war important?

5) What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?

a) What is Gorshkov's interpretation of the cooperation among the Soviet Armed Forces?

b) Should the Navy take advantage of foreign tactics in the development of their naval science?

c) What is the role of agreement and/or compromise in Gorshkov's decision scheme? Can collaboration be an effective tool?

d) What is the Party's view of utilizing diverse methods in obtaining their goals? Does Gorshkov agree?

3. Modification to Admiral Gorshkov's Operational Code

Most political elites, Admiral Gorshkov notwithstanding, have a tendency to deal with problems on a "lessons learned" basis. These lessons are viewed as decision models or precedents. An example might be Admiral

Gorshkov's early and continued exposure to the "small war" theory of Soviet naval science. He will draw from this model when faced with a "new" decision. Therefore, a decision process or scheme is developed, at least in part, from dealing with elements of past decisions even though the new circumstances may be entirely different.

Once a political elite has developed a decision approach (operational code), one must be very cautious when observing what may appear to be arbitrary changes to that approach. An actor's operational code becomes deeply engrained, and can only be altered after years of lengthy "salami slicing",* or else a particularly traumatic experience.

Particular emphasis and attention should be directed toward apparent changes in an actor's philosophic belief system. If Admiral Gorshkov were to change his perception of the US over time, then one could predict a basic change in the operational code of the Admiral. The image of one's opponent is the central structure of the entire operational code system. If an actor modifies his perception of the enemy, then his whole decision process is effected.

*"Salami slicing"--In this technique, an actor takes small, incremental steps toward a political objective. He does so in order to avoid confrontation with an opponent who has the power to block the attainment of the desired goal. No single step, taken individually, will cause the opponent to react, but, when the steps are integrated, the goal is achieved nonetheless. The important point of this approach is knowledge of the opponent's threshold of reaction. The opponent in this context is Admiral Gorshkov's own sub-conscious tendency to resist change. This term is used with different contextual meaning later in this thesis.

A basic hypothesis of this thesis is that Admiral Gorshkov has been consistent in his political views and perceptions during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. In order to prove or disprove this hypothesis, data is analyzed from two periods: prior to 1965 and post 1965. These two periods represent the rules of Krushchev and Brezhnev, respectively. The themes that make up Gorshkov's code will be scrutinized for consistency, or the lack thereof, over these two periods. The results of this analysis should portray whether Admiral Gorshkov's operational code has been modified by either leadership or time. Again, the initial hypothesis contends that no substantive changes have taken place.

B. CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. Why Content Analysis?

"Content analysis is a multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating problems in which the content of communications serves as the basis for inference (125:2)." Since personal interviews with Admiral Gorshkov are impractical, this thesis examines the subject on the basis of his communications. The primary source, then, for producing data to construct Admiral Gorshkov's operational code is the content analysis of his writings, interviews (public), and speeches: some 113 separate source documents in all. Procedures for the use of content analysis employed in this thesis are outlined by

Ole R. Holsti in Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities.

2. Objectivity, System, and Generality

Objectivity stipulates that each step in the research process must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures. A careful research design for this thesis was constructed and followed in order to minimize the researcher's subjective predispositions. The importance of academic replication was noted and tested. Each document was coded and analyzed in a systematic fashion. The results of the analysis were compared to the documented goals of Soviet leadership and naval science; thereby meeting the requirement for generality as it relates to theoretical relevance.

3. Categories, Units and Enumeration

Fifty main theme categories were formulated in this research effort by means of thematic analysis. The researcher initiated the analysis of Admiral Gorshkov with no preconceived ideas other than that the categories of analysis should reflect the basic purposes of the research. In essence, the data spoke for itself. Each document was analyzed in a general way in order to determine the basic themes which Gorshkov was espousing. Major theme categories soon emerged from this initial analysis. And just as quickly, the Admiral began to repeat these themes time and time again. These theme categories were derived from an analysis of public statements on public issues. The

analysis of the data was limited to its manifest content, and no effort was extended to uncover "deeper" meanings.

The general requirements for theme categories in content analysis are as follows: 1) that the categories reflect the purposes of the research, 2) be exhaustive, 3) be mutually exclusive, 4) independent, and 5) be derived from a single classification system (125:95). The fifty categories of this research certainly reflect the purposes of the research, because sufficient information was readily available in these categories to "answer" the questions necessary to formulate the Gorshkov code. The categories were not independent or mutually exclusive because of the complex interdependence of so many of the variables associated with Admiral Gorshkov's belief system. However, the research was not impaired significantly because of these limitations.

The recording unit for all analysis in this thesis is the theme. Thematic analysis was utilized exclusively in formulating data to be used in Gorshkov's operational code. Once a theme was detected in a subject document, it was coded and listed in one of the fifty categories listed in Appendix A.

Theme frequency was the common unit of enumeration employed in this thesis. Frequency of appearance is defined as dichotomous: the theme was either present or not. Multiple occurrences of a theme in the same document were registered as a single occurrence. Statistical analyses

were completed for each category to determine the percentage of occurrence of each theme throughout the entire sample, and to determine a ranking or priority of themes as elicited by Admiral Gorshkov. Each document of the sample received equal weight in calculating its contribution or effect on the total sample.

4. Sampling, Reliability, and Validity

Sample size for the Gorshkov study was 113 documents. This represents by far the largest sample of Gorshkov documents systematically analyzed to date. The sample was limited to public statements because of the non-availability of unclassified private statements. However, the purpose of this research is the analysis of public beliefs, and private statements would add little to the intent of this investigation. A major restriction on sampling is the limitation of available translated documents. However, even this limitation is ameliorated by the fact that all major "Navy Day" speeches by Admiral Gorshkov have been translated, and these represent the bulk of his major policy statements. In addition, Admiral Gorshkov's epic series, "Navies in War and Peace" is nearly a sufficient sample by itself. In short, the sampling procedures of this thesis are more pervasive than any other similar study yet undertaken.

Reliability ensures that repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results (125:135). Reliability in this thesis

was measured in the following manner: 1) ten coders were chosen to code two randomly selected passages each; 2) five coders were selected from the Naval Intelligence Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, two coders were selected from other activities at the School, and three coders were selected with no connection with the Graduate School whatsoever; 3) a short briefing on coding requirements was given to each coder; 4) the coders were asked to perform the following operations--a) determine the main themes in sample #1, and determine if a set of given themes was present in sample #2; 5) then mean averages were calculated to determine intercoder reliability as well as category reliability. Intercoder Reliability was 92%. Category Reliability was 89%. These tests are listed in Appendix B. A cross check of the findings of this thesis as compared to the conclusions obtained in a similar study by the Center for Naval Analysis also provides another reliability check (126; 127; 128 and 129).

The primary test of validity is whether "the results seem plausible." Predictive validity will be tested by the realization of results of Section VII. of the thesis. The rigor of the methodological procedures also lend a measure of validity to this research project. But the validity of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code and main themes must be determined ultimately by the reader. Does his code conform to the expansion of Soviet sea power? Have hardware decisions been made which bear out his views

on the submarine and the international mission of the Soviet Navy? Do his speeches have the ring of a Party ideolog. Construct validity can be assured by the careful execution of the operational code methodology, but ultimate validity can only be proven by the "plausibility" of the Gorshkov code and its attendant main themes.


IV. DATA ANALYSIS

One hundred and thirteen documents compose the source material from which data was extracted in order to form Admiral Gorshkov's operational code. The documents are English translations of Russian public statements made by Admiral Gorshkov. The inclusive dates of these statements run from July 24, 1955 to July 28, 1974: some 19 years of public comment. No information was available for 1957 or 1961. An average of six documents per year were available for coding. A high of seventeen documents were coded for 1972: the year of the "Navies in War and Peace" series. (See Figure 1 for a further breakdown of documents per year.)

Translations of the Gorshkov statements were provided by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), and Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). All translations were unclassified. Typical translations were extracted from the Soviet Home News Service, PRAVDA, TASS, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), Soviet Fleet, Trud, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), Za Rubezhom, Izvestiya, Literary Gazette, Soviet Russia, Agitator, etc...

Admiral Gorshkov makes major naval policy statements each year on Navy Day: normally the third week of July. Although the Navy Day statements are Gorshkov's principle annual address, he also speaks each year at other forums

Figure 1.



Documents translated by year

1972-- 17
 1968-- 10
 1967-- 9
 1969-- 9
 1970-- 8
 1974-- 8
 1963-- 7
 1965-- 7
 1973-- 7
 1966-- 6
 1962-- 5
 1971-- 5
 1958-- 4
 1959-- 3
 1964-- 3
 1955-- 2
 1960-- 2
 1956-- 1
 1957-- 0
 1961-- 0

Median = 5.5

Data Information:

Date of first sample:
 24 July 1955
 Date of last sample:
 28 July 1974
 Total sample size:
 113 documents
 Mean number of documents
 per year:
 5.65 or 6 documents
 Maximum number of documents
 for one year:
 17 in 1972
 Minimum number of documents
 for one year:
 0 in 1957 and 1961

such as Armed Forces Day, the Anniversary of the October Revolution, and the Anniversary of the Victory of the Great Patriotic War (WW II). Admiral Gorshkov has been interviewed on occasion, and he periodically publishes articles on naval science, but a vast majority of his translated public statements coincide with his addresses at major Soviet celebrations.

During 1972 and early 1973, Admiral Gorshkov published his epic, eleven-part series entitled "Navies in War and Peace." In this series, Admiral Gorshkov presented a summation of his concepts of naval science within the context of a historical survey of the expansion of Soviet sea power. This series was first printed in the Soviet Naval Digest, and ran some 50,000 words in length: comparable to a 150 page book. There is no Soviet publication at the unclassified level that approaches the "Navies in War and Peace" series in terms of its educational content or broad comment on matters of Soviet naval strategy.

Admiral Gorshkov used the "Navies in War and Peace" series to develop a unified view among his officers concerning the changing role of the Soviet Navy and its peacetime employment as an effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Further, through the wide use of historical example, the Admiral hoped to solidify the heroic traditions of the Soviet Navy once and for all. Gorshkov has often cited the value of propaganda in training cadres, and "Navies in War and Peace" certainly has the flavor of Soviet propaganda.

In terms of scope and length, the "Navies in War and Peace" series is sufficient for systematic analysis. Although the series represents only 10% of the total number of documents which this thesis analyzed, it nevertheless is an interesting benchmark with which to compare what Gorshkov said before and after its publication.

No classified or private statements were used in formulating data for the Gorshkov code. There are three reasons for this restriction. First, a basic premise of this thesis is the analysis of public opinions on public issues. Policy statements, public speeches and interviews, and published articles are the foremost indicators of Gorshkov's beliefs concerning public issues. His private comments might be interesting, but they are not available in sufficient quantity to withstand the rigors of systematic analysis. Second, although classified material relating to Admiral Gorshkov is available, classification per se makes academic replication difficult. One of the principle merits of this study is the collection of a large sample of unclassified Gorshkov statements under one cover. Substitution of classified material for unclassified documents would seriously reduce the dissemination of the product of this research effort, and be counterproductive to its basic purposes. Third, as will be discussed in Section VI., Admiral Gorshkov is amazingly consistent. He formulated all his primary naval themes by the early 1960's and has done little to depart from their basic content. In short,

thematic analysis renders a clear picture of Sergei Gorshkov without the necessity of resorting to either private or classified material.

V. THE GORSHKOV OPERATIONAL CODE

A. THE PHILOSOPHIC CONTENT OF GORSHKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE

1. What is Gorshkov's view of political life? Does he view the political universe as one of harmony or conflict? How does he perceive the fundamental character of the United States? Its Navy? Have Admiral Gorshkov's views changed?

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov views the political universe to exist in a state of intense and perpetual conflict. "After the division of the world into two systems as a result of the October Revolution in Russia, the policy of the imperialist powers was determined to a considerable degree by their constant desire to destroy the Soviet Union (95:53)." He views the chief protagonists in this struggle to be the United States and the Soviet Union. "The basic source of war remains the aggressive course of American imperialism, reflected in the US capitalist monopolies' striving for world domination (9:CC9)." "American policy and strategy, (is) aimed at one goal--the achievement of rule over the entire world by American monopolistic capital...(98:57)."

Admiral Gorshkov agrees with Lenin that "imperialism is the highest form of capitalism," and further that imperialism has reached its highest state of development in the United States (91:55). A quotation from his Navy Day

speech of 1967 clearly captures his view of capitalism and also the US: "Our country steadfastly pursues a peaceful policy. But we cannot for a minute forget the instructions of V.I. Lenin, that as long as capitalism exists and the economic foundations for the beginning of aggressive war remains, the danger exists of the unleashing of military adventures by reactionary circles of imperialism (43:19)."

Even as Admiral Gorshkov perceives the US as the basis for conflict in the world, he views its Navy as its most flexible military weapon. To Gorshkov, the US personifies the essence of imperialism projected through sea power. He describes the US Navy as a policy instrument as well as a strategic force. "The (US) Navy possesses the capability to vividly demonstrate the economic and military might of the US beyond its borders during peacetime (98:59)." "The (US) Navy represents not only a part of the armed forces, which was employed in war in naval theaters, but also a weapon of state policy in peacetime, which permits (the US) to enslave underdeveloped people and countries overseas, and to transform them into colonies (89:25)." The US Navy has "the capability to suddenly appear close to the shores of different countries and immediately proceed to carry out their assigned missions...as an important weapon of diplomacy and policy in peacetime, which in many cases has permitted the achievement of political goals without resorting to military operations by merely threatening to initiate them (98:59)."

"Demonstration of naval force by the leading capitalist sea powers have been employed more than once to put pressure on the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist community. The US Navy has especially distinguished itself by special activity in these operations. In the postwar years, it was handed the role of a connecting link in a chain of bridgeheads and military bases created by the American imperialists around the perimeter of the border of our country. The American Navy with its attack groups of nuclear forces was supposed to fill in the gaps in this 'ring of fire'...(98:62)." "In the opinion of US military leaders, the US Navy in modern times constitutes a most important means of nuclear rocket attacks against the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp...(23:1)." "The US militarist circles give priority to the development of submarine missile systems...because they are less vulnerable (80:M2) "...but "the US Sixth Fleet also can strike the central portions of the USSR from their bases in the Mediterranean with nuclear armed carrier aircraft (103:1)." Gorshkov states that "50% of the total strategic nuclear-rocket power of the armed forces of the US is concentrated in the US Navy (27:CC3)." He argues that that percentage will increase.

The theme of hostility runs throughout Admiral Gorshkov's statements as regards the United States and its Navy. He cites the 1960 incursion of Soviet airspace by a US U-2 (12:CC3), the "Caribbean Crisis" of 1962 (17:1),

the rearmament of W. Germany and the foundation of NATO (10:CC9), the continued violations of international law at sea (46:1), US Naval provocations in the Black and Baltic Seas (81:3), and US plans for massive exploitation of the world's oceans (99:56). The Admiral characterizes the US Navy as a "policeman's stick (30:CC3)." He specifically derides US intervention in Vietnam, Cuba, Turkey, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Lebanon, Cambodia, Laos, Isreal, Germany, and "other Latin American and African countries." He renounces the "ring of fire" created by the US through NATO "in order to encircle the socialist community (98:62)."

Admiral Gorshkov firmly embraces the conflict theory of dialectical materialism (89:20). He is confident of the "ultimate victory of Communism in its dialectic clash with capitalism (62:E8)." The Admiral contends that no quarter can be given, no middle ground realized, in the conflict with capitalism. "The enemy (whether in war or peace) must be utterly annihilated (24:10)." "Although the military-technical revolution (and its political counterpart) is constantly introducing new things in all military affairs ...the final goals of naval warfare (and political confrontation) remain the same: defeat of the enemy and the destruction of his vital forces and material (89:20)."

Admiral Gorshkov notes on several occasions that after World War II, capitalist countries with traditional naval power rose to prominence. He states that the United

States headed this group. The Admiral has great respect for the power of the US Navy, and as early as 1958 spoke of preparing "for operations against a strong, technically well-equipped enemy (5:1)." The Admiral's respect and even envy have not subsided in the intervening years.

Admiral Gorshkov's view of political life and his perception of the enemy have not changed over time. (See C. "Modifications to Admiral Gorshkov's Operational Code.") A hostile view of the enemy was projected in 70% of Admiral Gorshkov's public statements during the Krushchev era and in 64% of his statements under Brezhnev.

However, Admiral Gorshkov has increased his references to ideological concepts in recent years. (e.g. See theme #32, Section VI.) If anything, the Admiral has become more conservative, militant, and hard-line during the Brezhnev rule. Political ideology per se was only mentioned in 18% of Gorshkov's sampled public statements under Krushchev; whereas under Brezhnev that same figure has nearly doubled to 32%. Political ideology must now be considered a vital theme in Gorshkov's operational code.

The only verbal evidence of Admiral Gorshkov's mellowing in recent years is a single quotation in May 1974 in which he indicates: "the imperialists...have begun to orient themselves toward the principles of peaceful co-existence...(109:V5)." However, the Admiral quickly hastens to add that "the nature of capitalism remain the same (109:V5)."

Admiral Gorshkov is faced with the dilemma of dealing with an enemy which he fundamentally distrusts. The Kremlin leadership would pursue a policy of reapproachment with the West, but the Admiral has difficulty with this tactic. On the one hand, Admiral Gorshkov is required to praise the "tireless activity of Comrade Brezhnev" in pursuit of Detente. He acknowledges Brezhnev's "historic trips to the US, France, and Cuba." He admits the legitimacy of "Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence with states with different social systems," and "advocates the resolution of unsettled problems by negotiation (62:E8)." But on the other hand, the Admiral always stops short. He never quite buys the whole "Detente package." One common, consistent, unequivocal theme runs through every public statement that he renders: the Soviet people and the Soviet Armed Forces must vigilantly guard against the aggressions of international capitalism. The enemy may change his tactics for the short term, but he is the enemy all the same until he is "utterly defeated." This is Admiral Gorshkov's "bottom line."

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov views the political arena as one of intense dialectic conflict between socialism and capitalism. He perceives the US as basically hostile, and the US Navy as the most flexible projection of that hostility. The Admiral has emphasized ideology in recent years, but his basic views of political life have not changed in his 19 years as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can Gorshkov be optimistic on this score?

Admiral Gorshkov has always been confident of the ultimate triumph of communism, and of the expansion of Soviet sea power. He constantly speaks of the historic traditions of the Soviet Navy (58:E3). He points to communism's "victorious procession around the planet (46:19)." He asserts that historical experience has proven the correct foresight of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the infallible interpretation of that doctrine by the Communist Party (24:2).

Gorshkov interprets that "The sum effect of the Great Fatherland War was to produce a fundamental change in the balance of power in the international arena, and that change favors socialism (24:15)." He quotes Brezhnev as stating that World War II "signified the victory of progress over reaction, humanism over barbarity, and the victory of socialism over the obscuration of imperialism. This victory opened up the path for an upsurge in the revolutionary struggle of the working class, the unprecedented scale of the national liberation movement, and the downfall of the shameful colonial system (109:V4)." However, Admiral Gorshkov hastens to add "that although world imperialism was weakened, it did not abandon its objective--the destruction of communism (109:V4)."

In spite of the ever-present danger of imperialism, Gorshkov admonishes "that there are no forces in the world

capable of pulling down socialism, of bringing to their knees the people who are tied to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, devoted to the socialist Motherland, and solid in their support of Lenin's Party. This is the stern warning to the imperialist aggressor, the stern lesson of history (49:9)."

Gorshkov believes that the key to the victory of world-wide communism lies in the "leadership and primacy of the Communist Party (93:223)." Of course, he means the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He continues his argument, "As required by its position as the first socialist country in the world," the Soviet Armed Forces represents the defensive shield of the entire socialist community against imperialist encroachment. (Brezhnev Doctrine.) The Admiral contends that the Soviet Navy is the most flexible component of the Soviet Armed Forces in fulfilling this fraternal, international mission. In 1973, Admiral Gorshkov forecast that the "Future growth in the power of our navy will be characterized by an intensification of its international mission (101:64)." The Admiral thus completes the circle of his argument. He links the victory of world-wide communism with the international mission of the Soviet Navy.

Admiral Gorshkov has reason to be optimistic about the prospects of realizing his goals for communism and his Navy. In 1955, the Navy was fourth in prestige among the four main branches of the Soviet Armed Forces. By his

own account, the Soviet Navy now vies for first position among the five main branches of the Armed Forces. Gorshkov has carefully nurtured the prestige of the Soviet Navy until it now shares the title of "main deterrent shield of the socialist community" with the Strategic Rocket Forces. In terms of strategic survivability (99:63) and the ability to project international influence, Admiral Gorshkov has reason to believe that the Soviet Navy may soon stand alone as "first among equals" in the Soviet Armed Forces.

But even as capitalism threatens to destroy communism, the perceptive Admiral recognizes that complacency can lay the seeds for the decline of Soviet Naval prestige. Admiral Gorshkov constantly admonishes and inspires his Navy to feats of ever-increasing dedication and perfection through the use of critical self-analysis and socialist competition. He is well aware that as capitalism presents a catastrophic threat to communism, complacency can be an equally insidious enemy to the development of Soviet sea power. The Admiral constantly strives to avert such unpleasant eventualities.

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov is optimistic about the future of communism and the expansion of Soviet Naval prestige and power. He contends that the dual threat of capitalism and complacency can be defeated through vigilance, dedication, critical self-analysis, and last, but not least, through the inspired leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

3. Is the political universe predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

Admiral Gorshkov accepts the strong determinist streak which runs through Marxist philosophy. He believes in the "ultimate triumph of communism." He believes that the Soviet Union is and always will be "the first country of socialism." As early as 1955, Admiral Gorshkov predicted that the Soviet Union would be a great naval power (2:CC5). These kinds of events are deterministic, predictable, and absolute. However, the path and time table for the achievement of these goals is not predictable.

Gorshkov rationalizes this indeterminant component of his belief system by strong reliance on the inspired "leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party," the scientific basis of Lenin's principles of Military Science (93:223-224), and modern operational research techniques employing the latest forecasting techniques through the use of computers (41:20). By utilizing this triumverate, Admiral Gorshkov hopes to reduce uncertainty, and to "expedite" the historical process.

The Admiral firmly believes that whether faced with the problem of naval expansion or wars of national liberation, only the Communist Party can make the correct interpretation of events in order to assure success. In the case of the Navy, "it (CPSU) is required to analyze every primary achievement and trend in the development of a technical idea, to identify the role of the Navy within

the overall system of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Government, and to make a comprehensive assessment of the nation's economic resources. Only the Party could take on all that (24:18)."

Gorshkov believes that careful analysis can negate forecasting error. He quotes Lenin as saying that "Every battle includes the possibility of defeat, and there is no other means of reducing this possibility than to organize the preparation of the battle (93:224)." Gorshkov is a strong advocate of planning and organization. Further, once he has formulated a plan, he requires that it be pursued and executed with utmost discipline. "To slip or lose your head, is to lose everything (93:224)."

Admiral Gorshkov stresses the continuous advance of the military-technical revolution (89:20). He announces the importance of keeping abreast with this advance. He tries to optimize his naval forecasts through new qualitative measuring techniques (89:19), through analyzing the capabilities of the enemy and borrowing from them where necessary (93:223), and by developing massive fleet exercises which resemble combat operations to the fullest extent possible (94:55). But in spite of these comprehensive procedures, the Admiral still acknowledges the primacy of the CPSU in all forecasting matters.

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov believes that he can predict that final outcome of his Party and Navy with great accuracy, but he cannot predict the path or time-table of

these ends with as high a degree of confidence. Gorshkov is a bold exponent of the scientific method as a problem solving technique. He contends that well-calculated, decisive action can expedite the historical process. With the patronage of the Communist Party, the support of "Lenin's Industrial Program," and the "correct measure of naval effectiveness," Admiral Gorshkov believes that he has been able to interpret the most correct path for Soviet naval expansion. With these methods, the Admiral has been able to "predict and expedite" the historical process.

4. How much control or mastery can one have over historical development?

Throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov often has cited the contributions of Marx, Lenin, Krushchev, and Brezhnev as actors who controlled and advanced the cause of Communism and the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov believes that such actors can control historical development. He contends that the Party, and particularly its Central Committee, is the primary source of such actors. He also believes that the Armed Forces, and the Navy in particular, can be an important instrument in the training and development of such political elites. Admiral Gorshkov indicates that the Soviet Navy as the "Vanguard of the Revolution" has a special relationship to the Party and has been an important factor in its development (105:2).

Admiral Gorshkov predicts that the Navy can best improve control over its own destiny, as well as that of the Party's, by advancing knowledge and discipline through ideological training. "The commanding officer of a ship... (plays a vital role in this developmental process)...as the main organizer of combat training and political education (105:2)." Gorshkov states that political training is not only helpful to the Navy, but to socialist society in general. "In the years of naval service the navymen are also undergoing an efficient school of political and cultural training. Hence, even after demobilization when

returning to peaceful work, they continue to imitate the glorious naval traditions and by stubborn work at construction sites and in collective farms, at the factories and plants, are obtaining the right to be in the foremost ranks of the builders of communism (35:CC7)."

Gorshkov praises the special relationship of the Komsomol and the Navy as the primary source of ideological vigor. He characterizes the qualities derived from Komsomol membership as : "Political consciousness, discipline, and crystal clear honesty...(33:CC3)." He takes great pride in the fact the "Nine out of ten sailors are Komsomol members or communists. They are ready for new daring, for new exploits on behalf of the Socialist Fatherland (33:CC3)." The relationship between the Komsomol and the Soviet Navy is a major theme in 20% of Gorshkov's statements. Gorshkov measures the "morale and team spirit" of a ship's crew by their political consciousness (105:4). And Admiral Gorshkov believes that discipline and political consciousness can be developed best through organizations like the Komsomol.

As a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Gorshkov envisions himself as a part of the "guiding light of Soviet destiny." In the mid 1950's, it was "the Central Committee of our Party (which) defined the path of fleet development, as well as the fleet's role and place in the system of the Armed Forces in the country. The course taken was one which required the construction of an oceangoing fleet, capable of carrying our

offensive strategic missions (41:19)." Gorshkov sees the Central Committee of the Communist Party as the chief directorate of Soviet policy; whether that policy relates to control of the military or the government. The "Central Committee" theme is vital to Gorshkov's operational code, and appears in 55% of all his public statements.

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov believes that dedicated, disciplined actors from within the Communist Party can "move" history. He believes that the Party is the source of all such actors, and that the Central Committee of the CPSU is the vehicle by which such actors can direct communist advancement. Further, the Admiral visualizes the Navy as an excellent training ground for the education and development of the future "leaders and builders of communism."

5. What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

Admiral Gorshkov discounts the role of chance in human affairs. He admits that "political opportunities"--e.g. wars of national liberation--will present themselves, but that the "perfect" communist decision process will have ready alternatives for such contingencies. Gorshkov believes that "all politically important events are explainable under the laws of Marxism and Leninism." He also believes that it is the main task of the Party leadership to systematically interpret these laws in order to determine the "correct path" for communist advancement. Gorshkov contends that the Party must develop a well-defined position on all issues. To do less, and to try to "muddle through," is to court disaster (93:224). Chance has no place in this process.

Gorshkov affirms that the Soviet analytic process (dialectical materialism) is responsive to the dynamic state of the political universe, provides the most precise methods for developing Soviet interests, and counteracts the continuing plots and intrigues of capitalism.

Gorshkov believes that the best way to advance Soviet naval science is to reduce uncertainty through well-articulated plans and strategies. He states that "Soviet naval science, which is based on a uniquely scientific methodological base, that of dialectical materialism, is completely responsive to the fleet's material technical

base...(41:21)." Gorshkov advocates a planning process whose "primary requirement...(is) that of maintaining all branches of naval science at the level of the latest achievements of science and technology (41:21)."

If chance plays no part in Gorshkov's perception of the Soviet planning process, then neither does it play a significant role in his perception of his opponent's actions. He constantly points to the aggressive "plans and calculations" of the imperialists. In the "Navies in War and Peace" series, Gorshkov speaks of World War I as a capitalist "plan" to redivide the world (92:47). He describes US "plans" for expansion in Latin American, Africa, and Asia (94:48). He outlines German "plans" for the preparation of World War II, and exposes the capitalist plot for directing German aggression against the USSR (94:48). He warns of US plans for massive exploitation of the world's oceans (99:56). Behind every capitalist action, there is a sinister, well-formulated strategy.

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov discounts the role of chance in either the affairs of the Soviet Union or its enemies. He believes that political uncertainty can be reduced by reliance on planning for all alternatives, through the broad application of dialectical materialism, and by identifying capitalist intrigues as soon as they appear.

B. THE INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS OF GORSHKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

Admiral Gorshkov has demonstrated remarkable success in espousing the military line within the Communist Party. He has been particularly effective in selecting "objectively possible" goals for the Navy. Gorshkov has been required to select goals which satisfy the needs of both the Central Committee leadership and the General Staff. The Admiral's selection process advocates the pursuit of graduated objectives leading to an optimum goal, while avoiding "political adventures."

The selection of graduated objectives creates a dilemma between Admiral Gorshkov's view of the ultimate victory of communism and the choice of the most immediate means of achieving that goal. On the one hand, the Admiral advocates the rapid exploitation of all opportunities which will advance the Party or the Navy. But on the other hand, he is enough of a realist to discern that many "opportunities" also possess the "opportunity" for disaster. In order to solve this dilemma, the Admiral has developed a strategy which sets an optimum goal, but whose methodology is integrated through a series of well-calculated, incremental steps. The political concept of "salami slicing" is an excellent characterization of Gorshkov's goal selection process. An example of his goal selection strategy in action is the manner in which he expanded the

prestige of the Navy within the Soviet Armed Forces. This process is explained in detail in Instrumental Belief #2.

Admiral Gorshkov views the Communist Party as the final arbiter of the selection and priority of Soviet political goals. He quotes Lenin as saying "Policy is the reason, while war (military) is only the instrument, and not the opposite. Consequently, it only remains to subordinate the military point of view to the political (89:20)." But as the good politician that he is, Admiral Gorshkov constantly emphasizes those "Party goals" which best advance the cause of the Navy. An example of such support is the manner in which the Admiral lauds the "international mission of communism." It is more than coincidence that he perceives the Soviet Navy as "fulfill(ing) an important role as an instrument of state policy in peacetime...(as well as)...a powerful factor for building communism...and strengthening international security (99:66)."

The Admiral advocates a policy of selecting goals which are "objectively possible" (Lenin's definition), but balances this optimism with three important admonitions: 1) never underestimate the enemy, 2) avoid adventures, and 3) consider long-term risks.

Admiral Gorshkov's optimizing strategy is bounded by the injunction against engaging in operations that overestimate one's own strength or underestimate the strength of the enemy. Such actions fail "to take into account the objective laws" of Lenin's Principles of

Military Strategy (93:223). "Everyone agrees that the conduct of an army (navy) which does not train itself to master all forms of weaponry, and all means and devises of combat which an adversary has or could have is foolish or even criminal (93:223)."

Gorshkov states that "the principles of strategy-- the study of the strong and weak points of the enemy, predicting his intentions, activeness and daring, purposefulness and flexibility in plans...and the decisive moment for action" should be constantly updated and refined (93:224). The Admiral points out that in an effort to "possess the requisite knowledge to skillfully combat a strong enemy," it may become necessary to "borrow...individual elements and achievements of the bourgeois art of war (93:224)." To minimize any of these principles is to limit your capability to defeat imperialist aggression.

A second injunction against the optimizing strategy is the avoidance of adventures. Krushchev's "Caribbean Crisis" falls in this category. An "adventure" is any action which foregoes the graduated objectives approach and which may lead to severe losses if unsuccessful. The payoffs for an adventure are limited to maximum gain or maximum loss. Admiral Gorshkov has carefully avoided such action in either the political development of the prestige of his Navy, or in the procurement of naval weapon systems.

A final injunction of the optimizing strategy is a warning against allowing one's decisions to be based on

short term gains to the exclusion of considerations of long term risk or cost. In short, the "material-technical base must be able to support desired goals." Programs must be matched with capability in a realistic manner. The "small war" theory debate of the mid-1920's in the Soviet Union is an example of a major conflict over the validity of this last injunction (41:2-3). Admiral Gorshkov stated that "the adherents of building a large surfact fleet were out of touch with the material and technical base available to our country...(those views) were, therefore, unrealistic (41:3)."

2. How are goals of action pursued most effectively?

Admiral Gorshkov divides his method of pursuing goals into two categories: the pursuit of goals in war, and the pursuit of goals in peace. Peaceful, political goals will be considered first.

Admiral Gorshkov pursues political goals in the same evolutionary way in which he selects them. Once a goal has been established, the Admiral will press forward with "cautious aggression" in effecting the goal. He is very aware of the political limits of his power, and always endeavors to secure support before pressing on with the task at hand. If the Admiral selects his goals in a graduated manner, then he pursues these gradations in an incremented fashion.

This description may appear to characterize the Admiral as meek and reserved; nothing could be farther from the truth. Gorshkov pursues his goals in an aggressive and dynamic manner, but he has learned the vagaries of the Soviet political system well. In order to achieve one's goals, one must create a political power base to support those goals. Once this legitimatizing process has been completed, maximum energy can be exerted in attaining the established objectives.

An interesting example of the necessity for establishing political support is shown in Gorshkov's early writing. During the Krushchev era, 1955-1965, Gorshkov utilized Krushchev's name to legitimatize his own policy

statements. Krushchev appears in 39% of all Gorshkov's statements during this early period. Brezhnev, on the other hand, appears in only 16% of Gorshkov's statements since 1965.

This disparity points to two interesting facts. First, Gorshkov employs the name of the General Secretary in order to legitimize policy statements. Second, once the Admiral had gained a sufficiently broad base of political support, he no longer perceived it necessary to "stamp" every policy statement with the General Secretary's name. Gorshkov still perceives political legitimacy as an important factor in pursuing goals (Note: he often uses Brezhnev's name when referring to the international mission of the Navy), but political support is most vital when either new to leadership circles, or when engaging in pursuit of controversial objectives. In any event, Admiral Gorshkov believes that political support is a necessary, but not sufficient condition in the effective pursuit of goals.

An analogy can be drawn between Gorshkov's method of pursuing goals and blowing up an elastic balloon. So long as even, steady pressure is applied slowly in all directions, the balloon will expand fully. But if the surface of the balloon is weak in one area (an uneven power base), or if too much pressure is applied too quickly in one direction, then the balloon will explode and all goals will be lost. So it is with Gorshkov's process

of "cautious aggression" in the pursuit of political goals.

An excellent example of Admiral Gorshkov's pursuit of peaceful goals is the manner in which he nurtured and developed the prestige of the Soviet Navy. In 1960, the Soviet Navy ranked fifth in prestige among the Soviet Armed Forces (116:60). Krushchev referred to its capital ships as "metaleaters," and that "such ships are good for carrying political leaders on visits and their guns are good for firing salutes, but not much else (116:67)." As late as 1957, some 20 Army officers outranked Gorshkov (125:56). In spite of these handicaps, Admiral Gorshkov set his sights on "the creation of a powerful navy (2:CC20)."

In the early years, Admiral Gorshkov always spoke of the Navy in terms of "the Faithful Helper of the Army." By 1964, Admiral Gorshkov indicated that the Navy had achieved coequal status with the Army "shoulder to shoulder (26:CC3)." In 1968, Admiral Gorshkov said that "the fleet--after the Strategic Missile Troops(SRT)--became our most important instrument for exerting decisive influence on an armed conflict in theaters of war involving tremendous distances (59:E5)." By 1969, Admiral Gorshkov referred to the Navy as "the frontier of our motherland's defense (65:E6)." In 1970, he said that "Lenin devoted a great amount of attention to establishing the Navy as the 'basic unit' of the Armed Forces of our State (75:19)." In 1971, Gorshkov announced that the Navy had achieved coequal

status with the SRT." "Together with atomic missile submarines of the Navy, the Strategic Missile Troops became the main means of containing an aggressor and decisively defeating him in war and became a reliable shield protecting the peaceful system of socialism (79:5)."

Today, Admiral Gorshkov contends that the Soviet Navy is first in prestige among the Soviet Armed Forces. He implies this because "missile carrying submarines... (have) great survivability in comparison with land-based launching systems, (and) are an even more effective means of deterrence (99:63)." Further, Admiral Gorshkov believes that the Soviet Navy is the Soviet Union's "most flexible instrument in the conduct of foreign policy."

In order to grasp the real flavor of how Admiral Gorshkov advanced the prestige of the Soviet Navy, the reader must survey the entire spectrum of the Admiral's speeches from 1955 to 1974. If one does this, the thread of the Admiral's methodology stands clear. First, the Admiral gathered political support, and then he pursued his goal in calculated, precise, incremental steps. However, all the while, the Admiral was keenly aware of his political limits. He continuously preached the importance of collaboration of all the Soviet Armed Forces. "The focus of attention on the Navy does not in any way imply any sort of unique importance of naval forces in armed combat... (89:21)." "We cannot place reliance on only one service of the Armed Forces. (He continues)...the main provision

in our military doctrine to effect a victory in a struggle against a strong enemy can be won only by the combined efforts of all services of the Armed Forces and by close coordination among them (79:5)." The Admiral judiciously spoke of cooperation as he prodded the Navy to the top.

Admiral Gorshkov's pursuit of goals in war is much more aggressive. The enemy must be pushed to the limit and "utterly defeated." "All-out offensive operations must be carried out right up to the complete rout of the enemy (93:224)." "Surprise attacks, and seizing and maintaining the initiative" is essential (93:224)." "The battle for the 'first salvo' is taking on special meaning in naval battle and under present day conditions. Delay in the employment of weapons (including nuclear) in a naval battle or operations will be fraught with the most serious and even fatal consequences...(99:63-64)." But even in war, the Admiral concedes that "it is wise to know when to stop." As Lenin warns, "the art of retreat must be mastered as well." Gorshkov states that the Navy must "intelligently combine defense and offense, depending on the situation (93:224)."

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov pursues his goals according to their nature. Peacetime, political goals must be pursued in an even, integrated manner with "cautious aggression;" ensuring all the while that adequate political support is maintained. Wartime goals may be pursued more vigorously, but even in war one "must know when to stop."

3. How are risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

Admiral Gorshkov recognizes that certain precipitous actions such as nuclear war, or direct confrontation with the US could initiate the annihilation of the Soviet Union and his Navy. He contends, however, that a strong defense linked with a policy of peaceful coexistence will reduce the risks of such an eventuality. The Admiral believes that major goals can be pursued with "limited, graduated means." He recognizes that these means must be controlled carefully or else a given situation could escalate into catastrophe. However, all acceptable risks must be borne in order to advance the cause of communism and the Soviet Navy.

Gorshkov admits that "the atomic mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that a powerful means of destruction had appeared which unavoidably demands a serious re-examination of the doctrines on carrying on war (24:17)." He refers to this era as "the revolution of nuclear weapons." And he goes on to state that the Soviet Union developed a "unity of views" on the use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with this new phase of warfare.

The Admiral warns that "anyone who encroaches on the USSR and the states friendly to it is in for a crushing retaliatory blow (13:BB11)." He quotes Defense Minister Malinovskiy "who declared that the USSR is capable of

razing from the face of the earth with one rocket-nuclear blow any targets, all the industrial and administrative-political centers of the United States, and destroying whole countries which lend their territories for the American military bases ringing the USSR and other socialist countries (13:BB11)."

Gorshkov strongly believes that the deterrent posture of the Soviet strategic forces reduces the risk of nuclear war, and that Soviet nuclear forces "have become a serious argument which even the most serious advocates of unleashing a new world nuclear rocket war...must consider (19:28)."

In spite of such saber-rattling as "atomic mushroom clouds" and "crushing retaliatory blows," Gorshkov perceives that "this does not mean that such a war is unavoidable (24:26)." "It is possible to avert a new world war" through the defensive might of the Soviet Union as "was graphically demonstrated during the period of acute exacerbation in the international situation that occurred in the Caribbean Sea area (24:26)."

The Admiral asks the rhetorical question: "What can the alternative to multilateral nuclear forces be? It is well known! It is the policy of peaceful coexistence... (28:5)." "The Soviet Union steadfastly and consistently defends the cause of peace and security of peoples and Lenin's principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems; and it advocates the resolution

of unsettled problems by negotiation (62:E8)." The "peace program of the 24th Congress" (Detente) is an extension of the Soviet pursuit of peace (109:V5).

If Admiral Gorshkov admits that nuclear war carries excessive risks, and only can be avoided through deterrence and peaceful coexistence, then how can communism advance its goals in the conflict environment of the international arena? The answer is found through the controlled use of "limited means" to obtain optimum goals.

The Admiral has great confidence that "situations" can be controlled if a "salami-slicing" approach is used. This incremental scheme produces minimum risks while providing steady progress toward the ultimate goal. Two examples of this process in action are national wars of liberation indirectly supported by the Soviet Union, and the manner in which the Admiral incrementally developed the position of the Navy within the Soviet Armed Forces.

Admiral Gorshkov perceives the Soviet Navy as the most effective "limited means" force that the Soviet Union possesses. Navies can "achieve political goals without resorting to military operations by merely threatening to initiate them (98:59)." "The role of a navy is not limited to the execution of important missions in armed combat. (A Navy)...has always been an instrument of policy... and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert

pressure on potential enemies without the direct employment of weaponry (98:59)."

In order to calculate the size of the "salami slices," Admiral Gorshkov falls back on Lenin's Principles of Strategy. This calculation system calls for "the study of the strong and weak points of the enemy, predicting his intentions, activeness and daring, purposefulness and flexibility in plans, the creation of superiority of forces and means in the main sectors, the correct determination of the most dangerous grouping at a given moment, and decisiveness of action (93:224)." If these principles are followed, limited means can be calculated which will obtain the desired goal without the dangers of escalation. Admiral Gorshkov stresses the importance of limiting the means and not the objective. This philosophy contrasts with the US experience in Korea and Vietnam of "limiting the objective."

Admiral Gorshkov speaks of "the unprecedented scale of the national liberation movement (109:V4)." But he recognizes also that the imperialists react to this movement through "the unleashing of numerous local wars... (in order) to direct the development of the events in the world arena (109"V4)." "Therefore, local wars can be regarded as a manifestation of the more determined imperialist methods for acting against the movement for national independence and progress (99:63)." Admiral Gorshkov recognizes the danger to the Soviet Union if they directly participate in this local wars. "Under certain

circumstances such actions carry with them the threat of escalation into world war (99:63)."

From an analysis of Gorshkov's remarks concerning the calculation, control, and acceptance of political risks, a summary shows: 1) that no action should be initiated which could destroy the Communist Party or the Soviet Navy as a viable entity, 2) a political situation can be controlled with the use of incremented, limited means: e.g. arms shipments, naval shows-of-force, economic pressure, etc., 3) there are viable alternatives to the risks of nuclear war: e.g. peaceful coexistence, Detente, negotiation, etc., 4) Lenin's Principles of Strategy are employed in the calculation of the "size of the salami slices," 5) Soviet participation in local wars must be controlled carefully because of the inherent danger of local wars escalating into general war, and 6) an admonition to undertake all acceptable risks in order to advance the cause of communism.

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

Admiral Gorshkov favors graduated, yet purposeful pursuit of interests. Such a belief excludes either procrastination or precipitous action. The Admiral believes that action should be timed according to the nature of the situation. In war, the battle for the first salvo is critical; whereas in peace, the pursuit of political goals must be timed according to political support.

Gorshkov contends that there are certain "opportunities" which must be pursued immediately, but that the Communist Party alone determines the timing of such actions.

As goals are distinguished according to their nature, so is timing distinguished according to the situation. In war, the Admiral speaks of quick, aggressive action. He points to the importance of initiative (105:3), surprise (93:224), and the "Battle for the first salvo (99:63)." He constantly invokes the necessity of readiness to respond to imperialist aggression. Gorshkov states that "the first moments of battle in modern warfare go a long way to determining the final outcome." Any "delay... (will lead) to serious and even fatal consequences (99:64)."

In peace, the Admiral is willing to wait for his victories. He believes in the careful calculation of the best means to affect a goal, and he recognizes the importance of obtaining a base of political support. Once these two objectives have been accomplished, the Admiral does not wish to reduce their effectiveness by either delay or precipitous action. Admiral Gorshkov is "deterministic" enough to be confident of the ultimate success of his programs and those of the Party. He is willing to bide his time, if need be.

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?

Admiral Gorshkov believes that all means are legitimate for advancing the interests of the Party and

the Soviet Navy. He advocates the simultaneous use of many diverse means to solve a problem. Where force fails, then the extended threat of force or hostile rhetoric might succeed. Other options which might contribute to the Soviet cause are: propaganda, negotiation, compromise, peaceful coexistence, wars of national liberation, economic sanctions, etc...Each of these methods might have utility in a specific situation.

An example of the use of many means for advancing a cause is the way in which the Soviet Union advances the Brezhnev Doctrine. Because of the USSR's preeminent position within the Socialist Block, the Soviet Union claims a special responsibility for ensuring the security of the Socialist Community from "imperialist corruption." Some of the different means that the Admiral has enumerated that the USSR employs are: 1) "the wise leadership of the CPSU," 2) "the Socialist economic system," 3) "the socio-political unity of Socialist society," 4) "the close cohesion of the people of the Army and the Navy around communists," and 5) "Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian Internationalism (62:E8)." Gorshkov notes the significance of the support and "international ties...of the WARSAW Pact countries (101:64)." He recognizes the importance of balance and integration among all the Soviet Armed Forces "cemented into a single monolith by the will of the Party (107:24)." The Admiral even sees a place for the transformation of enemy tactics and strategy into the

Soviet security system (99:223). Gorshkov perceives an important role for each of these many elements in securing the ideological integrity of the Soviet Block.

Another example of a "multiplicity of means to fulfill an interest" is the approach Gorshkov uses to attain his goal of a "Soviet sea power second to none." In fulfilling this goal, the Admiral stresses the need for "balanced development of forces of the ocean-going Navy... capable of carrying out tasks confronting them (99:66)." While the "basic unit of the Navy is the submarine," there are "needs for various other types of (aircraft and) surface ships (99:63)." The Admiral finds a definite place for missile carrying submarines and ASW submarines; a requirement for long-range missile carrying aircraft and ASW patrol aircraft; the need for amphibious ships and their attendant marine assault forces; the utility of oceanographic/research ships, fishing trawlers, and merchant ships. Naval forces can provide force, presence, and project the foreign policy initiatives of the CPSU. Oceanographic, fishing, and merchant ships can penetrate foreign areas economically, and can provide important intelligence information. Each of these diverse elements plays a useful and specific role in the Admiral's plan for balanced, integrated Soviet sea power.

Gorshkov, like Lenin, contends that there are no illicit means for advancing communism or the Navy. The outcome of a struggle with capitalism will not only depend

on the Armed Forces, but "on the entire people in the broadest sense of the word (93:223)."

C. MODIFICATION TO ADMIRAL GORSHKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE

Admiral Gorshkov's operational code has not changed significantly during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. His basic goals for the Navy and his relentless pursuit of these goals has remained constant. The Admiral's view of the enemy and his perception of the political arena is essentially the same now as it was in 1955. In short, Admiral Gorshkov's philosophic and instrumental beliefs have not altered over time or under different leaderships.

The emphasis which Admiral Gorshkov has placed on certain theme categories has changed over time. But changes in emphasis do not reflect changes in a basic instrumental or philosophic belief. Several theme categories may combine to form a single belief. Thus, there is a very complex relationship between theme categories and operational beliefs.

In any event, the results listed in Appendix A. portray the major themes that command Admiral Gorshkov's attention, and the corresponding importance which he has attached to these theme categories over time. It must be noted again that modification to theme emphasis does not correlate directly to modification of an operational code.

Examples of the consistency of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code are indicated in the public statements listed below. The reader should note the similarity of themes during the Krushchev era (1955-1965) with those of the Brezhnev period (1965-1974).

1. The enemy is hostile...

(1958) "The reactionary forces of imperialism, blinded by their wild hatred against socialism, are preparing a new military aggression against the camp of peace and democracy (6:3)."

(1959) "The basic source of war remains the aggressive course of American imperialism (9:CC7)."

(1974) "As in former times, the blade of the policies of aggressive imperialist circles in a number of countries is still raised over socialist countries, over nations that have selected a progressive road of developments (107:25)."

2. Ultimately, Communism will triumph...

(1963) "World War II produced a fundamental change in the balance of power in the international arena in favor of socialism (24:15)."

(1969) "No force in the world is capable of crushing socialism and forcing to their knees people loyal to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism...(62:E8)."

(1974) "The routing of Hitlerite Germany...signified the victory of socialism over the obscuration of imperialism (109:V4)."

3. The Party uses science, technology, and dialectical materialism to determine future goals...

(1958) "In the postwar years the Navy has continuously developed itself on a new technological basis.

(1967) "Soviet naval science, which is based on uniquely scientific methodological base, that of dialectical materialism (41:21)."

(1973) There is "a dialectical relationship between the development of naval forces and the state goals which they are intended to serve (89:20)."

4. The Party controls historical development...

(1956) "...the historic decision of the 20th Congress (3:CC3)."

(1959) "21st CPSU Congress...the entrance to the all-out construction of a communist society (9:CC8)."

(1971) "The decisions adopted by the 24th CPSU Congress have served to create new and unprecedented horizons on all fields of social development (81:1)."

5. Chance has no place in human affairs: everything is planned...

(1958) "The present international situation requires even more staunchness in training, and preparations for operations...(5:4)."

(1972) "Every battle includes the possibility of defeat, and there is no other means of reducing this possibility than to organize the preparation of battle (93:224)."

6. Risks must be calculated, and if they are excessive, alternatives must be determined...

(1963) "It is possible to avert a new world war (24:26)."

(1964) "What can be the alternative to multilateral nuclear forces be?...It is the policy of peaceful co-existence (28:5)."

(1969) "The Soviet Union steadfastly and constantly defends the cause of peace...and Lenin's principle's of peaceful coexistence (62:E8)."

(1972) "Navies...can achieve political goals without resorting to military operations by merely threatening to initiate them (98:59)."

(1974) "The Soviet Union's invariable consistency in pursuing the peace policy was again graphically confirmed by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev...relaxation of international tension... (113:V4)."

7. Utilize all means possible to pursue goals...

(1958) "the brotherly cooperation of soldiers in all branches of the service became one of the glorious traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces (4:2)."

(1960) "Victory in modern war can be attained only by using all means of armed combat (11:CC10)."

(1972) "the balanced development of the forces of an ocean-going Navy...(99:66)."

(1974) "the need for...taking into account the collaboration between the Army and the Navy...the principle of combined solution of combat tasks...(106:29)."

D. SUMMARY OF ADMIRAL GORSHKOV'S OPERATIONAL CODE

PHILOSOPHIC BELIEF SYSTEM

1. Admiral Gorshkov views the political arena to exist in intense and perpetual conflict between socialism and capitalism. He perceives the US as basically hostile, and its Navy as the primary projection of that hostility.

2. Gorshkov is optimistic about the ultimate triumph of communism, and of the expansion of Soviet sea power. The leadership of the Party will assure these victories, but the threat of imperialism is ever-present.

3. Though Gorshkov is confident of the final outcome of communism and the Navy, he cannot predict the path or timetable of that outcome with great confidence. He believes in planning and technological forecasts. With such techniques, and the patronage of the CPSU, Gorshkov states that uncertainties can be reduced and the "most correct" path chosen.

4. The Admiral perceives that dedicated, disciplined members of the CPSU can advance the cause of the Party and, hence, the Navy. He contends that the Party is the source of all such actors, and that the Navy provides an excellent training ground for the "builders of communism."

5. Chance has no place in human affairs: either those of the USSR or its opponents. All important events can be explained under the laws of Marx and Lenin. Planning must take into account all eventualities; even "unforeseen circumstances."

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEF SYSTEM

1. Goals must be selected through a process of graduated objectives which lead to the optimum goal. This "salami slicing" approach must be aggressive and optimizing, but bounded by injunctions against underestimating the enemy, participating in "adventures," or discounting long term risks for short term gains.

2. Goals should be pursued according to their nature. Peaceful, political goals should be pursued in an even, integrated manner, ensuring the maintenance of adequate political support. Wartime goals may be pursued vigorously, but with the limit of "knowing when to stop."

3. Risks must be calculated by the CPSU. No venture should be undertaken which could lead to the certain destruction of the Party or the Navy. Optimum goals can be achieved with "limited means." Local wars have the inherent danger of escalation. And finally, all acceptable risks must be taken in order to advance communism/Navy.

4. Procrastination or precipitous action are to be avoided. Timing must be determined according to the situation. In war, the "battle for the first salvo" is critical. In peace, goals must be "timed" with political support.

5. All means are legitimate for advancing the interests of the Party and the Navy. A diverse, yet integrated and balanced attack will have the greatest utility in effecting goals.

E. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

A basic criticism of the operational code construct is whether the code is sharp enough to differentiate between individuals who claim similar ideological beliefs. How fine must the input be in order to obtain the desired output? The Operational Code of the Politburo used the writings of Stalin and Lenin as input, but its output dealt with a bureaucratic group and not specific individuals. Operational codes have been written about former Secretary of State Rusk (130) and Senator Frank Church (131), but these codes were derived composites of public statements and personal interviews. The real question is: Is the "mesh" of the operational code system fine enough to depict unique, specific, individual traits without the benefit of face-to-face contact? Can public statements alone provide enough grist for the operational code mill? If so, can the operational code of Admiral Gorshkov be distinguished from that of Marshall Grechko? Or even more pointedly, can the Gorshkov code be separated from that of Admiral Kasatonov?

A definitive answer to these inquiries is not yet available. It is the subject of further research. But partial answers to these questions follow. First, Admiral Gorshkov's code can be distinguished from Marshal Grechko's code because Admiral Gorshkov's code has now been written, and Grechko's has not. This "answer" at first appears flippant and simplistic, but it points to a very important

fact: the operational code construct has not been widely used. The true accuracy and effectiveness of the operational code will not be measured until a reasonable sample of codes on Soviet military elites has been formulated. Soviet elites present an interesting challenge to the operational code because Soviets so often must be studied exclusively by their public communications. The Gorshkov code is an important first step. As Alexander George commented, the operational code has been a neglected analytical system (123). But the Gorshkov code demonstrates that this methodology offers possibilities for systematic analysis where none had existed before.

Second, this particular exercise is limited to an analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's public statements and, hence, his public role. Public statements cause an impediment in "getting to the core" of an actor. This author believes that there is a high correlation between the Admiral's public and private views, but the quantification of this relationship is presently impractical. If a valid system could be developed which would clearly indicate the dependence of public statements on private views, then the operational code of Admiral Gorshkov could more clearly reflect his personal character. To date, the linkage between Admiral Gorshkov's public and private views/roles must remain another area for future research.

Third, a comparison between Admiral Gorshkov's operational code and that of the Politburo in 1951 can

be drawn and the differences noted. This exercise is weakened by the time domain differences of the two codes (1955 to 1974 vs. 1951), but the comparison can be instructive nonetheless. Admiral Gorshkov perceives the US Navy as the primary means of the projection of US hostility toward the USSR. The Politburo, for its part, did not specifically characterize the US Navy as the prime US threat. Next, Admiral Gorshkov is a staunch supporter of technological forecasting, operations research, and planning and projections based on carefully controlled combat training and exercises. The Politburo placed much greater emphasis on ideological considerations than does the Admiral, and it stressed the political determinants of the decision process rather than advanced systems approaches. Admiral Gorshkov is more conservative in his goal selection process than was the Politburo. The Admiral deals in the art-of-the-possible, and selects only those objectives which have a high probability of being attained. In this area, he is much more pragmatic than the Politburo. Finally, if the Admiral appears constrained in the selection of his goals, quite the opposite is the case for the manner in which he pursues them. The Admiral has a tendency to error on the side of precipitous action. This tendency should not be overdramaticized, but it does appear in a careful reading of Gorshkov's rhetoric. The Admiral is a skilled, disciplined, astute politician who recognizes the lobbying power of the other branches of the Armed

Forces, but his public support for Naval causes has, at times by Western standards, approached fanatical dimensions. Such an approach may have merit in war, but it is bound to cause political anxiety in the Ministry of Defense in peace.

In summary, Admiral Gorshkov's operational code may favor a description of his role playing rather than provide insight into his innermost convictions. But such a shortcoming appears to be a fundamental limitation of the operational code construct when analyzing an actor's belief system without the benefit of private discourse. The total validity and effectiveness of the operational code will only be realized when a broad spectrum of military elite codes have been compared and scrutinized. The Gorshkov code can be compared with The Operational Code of the Politburo in a limited way in order to determine the differences of Admiral Gorshkov's application of Soviet ideology today and its bureaucratic interpretation in 1951. Finally, many areas remain for further research in the operational code methodology. One noteworthy area is the requirement for a system which will derive specific, individual characteristics from an input limited to public communications. A linkage model must be developed which will quantify the relationships between important public and private communications variables. An interim solution to part of these quandries is the in-depth thematic analysis approach utilized in this thesis and illustrated in the following sections.

VI. THEMATIC ANALYSIS

In analyzing the Gorshkov material, it became readily apparent that several main themes persisted throughout his statements. For the purposes of this research, a main theme was defined as a major point or significant objective of a particular piece of communication. The term significant was and is a difficult quality to grasp, but a limited emersion in the data quickly eliminated this troublesome conceptual problem. The coder reliability figures delineated in Section III attest to this fact.

Each individual theme within each document of the entire sample was analyzed in the following manner. First, the theme categories were defined and separated. Second, related themes were grouped under main category headings. Third, the date of the first instance of a particular theme category was indicated. The date of the last appearance of a theme category was also indicated if significant: e.g. the last reference to Krushchev was important, as was the date of the first individual reference to Brezhnev. The lack of appearance of certain important facts was also significant; such as the complete exclusion of Stalin's name from all 113 documents! Fourth, the number of appearances for each individual theme was extracted from the coding sheets and tabulated. Recall that for an individual document, a theme category was either listed present or not. Multiple

listings of a given theme within a single document were disallowed. Fifth, a statistical analysis was made of the theme category's frequency of appearance over the entire sample and as distributed during the Krushchev and Brezhnev years. Sixth, any significant background information was collected from the context in which the themes appeared. Seventh, all pertinent comments relating to the application of a particular theme to Admiral Gorshkov's operational code were recorded. And eighth, representative quotations of each individual theme category were enumerated. This entire process was rigorously and systematically applied to each and every document, and to each and every theme category within the document. Some 1,230 separate themes were placed in main categories and carefully analyzed.

Fifty subject areas were categorized as the main themes of the Goshkov statements. These categories are listed in section VIII: Appendix A. When content analysis of all 113 documents was completed, a statistical analysis of the fifty theme categories was undertaken.

Since the quantitative measuring device of this thesis is thematic frequency, frequency of appearance figures were calculated for each category. These figures were structured two ways. First, the frequency of a theme over the entire sample was calculated. Second, the frequency of appearance of the main themes were calculated separately for the Krushchev period, and then calculated again for the Brezhnev era. Both periods equal approximately $9\frac{1}{2}$ years. This


second breakdown was executed in order to analyze the consistency of the Gorshkov code over time, and under two distinct leaders.

The results of the frequency distribution calculations follow: 1) the mean value of the frequency of appearance of a given theme over the entire sample is 22.72%; 2) the median value of the frequency of appearance of a given theme over the entire sample is 16%; 3) the standard deviation about the mean for the entire sample is 18.31%.

From the figures listed above, and from an analysis of Figure 2, the reader can determine that any theme with a frequency of appearance greater than 22% is not only a main theme to Admiral Gorshkov, but also an important one. Examples are: Lenin's Industrial Program; Soviet Naval Mission; and the Balanced Navy Concept. Any theme with a frequency of appearance greater than 40% is of vital importance to Admiral Gorshkov's operational code. Examples are: The Leadership of the CPSU; The Technological Revolution and its consequences; and The View of the Enemy. Similarly, any theme with a frequency of appearance of 4% or less is either a very new theme, or else a theme of minor significance. Examples are: Proletarian Internationalism, and Command and Control.

As was indicated above, the impact of time upon Admiral Gorshkov's operational code was analyzed by dividing the sample data into two time periods. The first period coincides with Krushchev's leadership, and the second

Figure 2



Overall Frequencies of Individual Themes

<u>Theme #</u>	<u>%</u>				
1.	=46%	11.	=7%	21.	=30%
2.	=32%	12.	=11%	22.	=41%
3.	=55%	13.	=39%	23.	=12%
4.	=20%	14.	= 4%	24.	=10%
5.	=36%	15.	=37%	25.	=17%
6.	=25%	16.	=15%	26.	=27%
7.	=20%	17.	=18%	27.	=13%
8.	=21%	18.	=66%	28.	=12%
9.	=16%	19.	=23%	29.	= 7%
10.	=60%	20.	=14%	30.	= 6%
				31.	=27%
				32.	=27%
				33.	=19%
				34.	=14%
				35.	=42%
				36.	= 9%
				37.	=26%
				38.	=12%
				39.	=12%
				40.	=11%
				41.	=12%
				42.	=16%
				43.	= 8%
				44.	=12%
				45.	= 8%
				46.	=100%
				47.	=16%
				48.	= 9%
				49.	=12%
				50.	= 4%

with Brezhnev's. The two periods extend from mid 1955 to 1965, and from 1965 to mid 1974, respectively. Thematic frequency distributions were calculated for all fifty main categories in each of the two periods. The results of these calculations were compared category by category. These comparisons were made in order to ascertain the net increase or decrease in the frequency of appearance of a particular theme across the two periods. The direction of emphasis in any thematic change also was recorded. The tabulated results of this process are displayed in Figure 3.

An analysis of Figure 3 indicates certain conclusions. First, on balance, Admiral Gorshkov was and is a very consistent individual. There were only four new theme categories which appeared in the Brezhnev years that had not been present under Krushchev: 1) Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geographic environment; 2) Exploitation of the world's oceans--the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research; 3) Soviet interest in the Mediterranean; and 4) Command and control. Vital themes such as the importance of historical development, the direction of the CPSU, the image of the opponent, and the primacy of the submarine, indicated little if any change. Four theme categories reflected 0% change between the two periods: 1) New qualitative measures of a navy's effectiveness; 2) the US has lost its naval supremacy; 3) The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance; and 4) Socialist Competition. Twenty-six categories indicated

Figure 3

Theme Categories and the Net % Change in Frequency of Appearance between the Krushchev and Brezhnev Periods (50 Themes Tested):

<u>Theme #</u>	<u>Krushchev</u>	<u>Brezhnev</u>	<u>% increase/decrease</u>
1. 5.	44%	46%	+2%
2. ✓	24%	35%	+11%
3. 4.	62%	52%	-10%
4.	27%	17%	-10%
5. 4.	50%	30%	-20%
6.	21%	26%	+5%
7.	12%	24%	+12%
8.	15%	24%	+9%
9.	18%	15%	-3%
10. 3.	52%	63%	+11%
11.	12%	5%	-7%
12.	3%	14%	+11%
13. 7	39%	N/A	References to Krushchev
14.	3%	4%	+1%
15. 9.	32%	39%	+7%
16.	15%	15%	No change
17.	15%	19%	+4%
18. 0. 1.	70%	64%	-6%
19.	18%	25%	+7%
20.	15%	14%	-1%
21. 1.	32%	30%	-2%
22. ✓	23%	48%	+25%
23.	15%	11%	-4%
24.	15%	8%	-7%
25. 8	32%	10%	-22%
26.	29%	27%	-2%
27.	24%	8%	-16%
28.	26%	6%	-20%
29.	8%	6%	-2%
30.	8%	5%	-3%
31. ✓	8%	34%	+26%
32. ✓	18%	32%	+14%
33.	8%	23%	+15%
34.	6%	18%	+12%
35. 6.	41%	42%	+1%
36.	15%	6%	-9%
37.	29%	24%	-5%
38.	12%	12%	No change
39.	12%	12%	No change
40.	3%	14%	+11%
41.	6%	15%	+9%
42.	9%	19%	+10%

Figure 3 (continued)

<u>Theme #</u>	<u>Krushchev</u>	<u>Brezhnev</u>	<u>% increase/decrease</u>
43.	3%	10%	+7%
44.	6%	15%	+9%
45.	None	11%	New theme
46.	100%	100%	No change
47.	N/A	16%	References to Brezhnev
48.	None	13%	New theme
49.	None	18%	New theme
50.	None	5%	New theme

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Number of increases = +22
Number of decreases = -18
No change = 4
New themes = 4
Brezhnev & Krushchev = 2
Mean value of % change = 8%
Number of changes over 10% = 17
Maximum change = 26%
Minimum change = 0%

a net change in frequency of appearance of over 18%. However, even these major shifts reflected a change in emphasis rather than a radical departure from precedent.

The mean value for the percentage of net change of all fifty theme categories was 8%. Twenty-two themes indicated an increased emphasis during the Brezhnev era, and eighteen themes registered a decreased emphasis from the Krushchev period. Four new themes appeared under Brezhnev, but no themes from the Krushchev period were discounted completely. Appendix A. clearly illustrates all this statistical information on an individual theme basis.

A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF MAIN THEME CATEGORIES

Theme

1. The historical tradition of the Soviet Navy
2. Guarding the maritime borders of the USSR and the labors of communism
3. The leadership of the CPSU
4. The special relationship of the KOMSOMOL and the Soviet Navy
5. Cooperation of the Navy with other branches of the Armed Forces
6. The Soviet Union is not only a great continental land power, but also a great naval power
7. The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet interests at sea
8. The development of Soviet Naval Science
9. All Armed Forces and the entire populace must contribute to ensure victory

10. The technological revolution and its consequences
11. Reference to the Minister of Defense
12. The USSR cannot be a world power without a strong Navy
13. Krushchev and his position as a patron of the Navy
14. Proletarian Internationalism
15. The importance of long cruises
16. Socialist Competition
17. Training must parallel combat conditions
18. View of the enemy
19. Lenin's industrial program
20. The ultimate triumph of communism
21. Soviet naval mission=defend the sea frontiers
(strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces
at sea (same) + strike blows against targets in
distant continents (strategic offense)
22. The international mission of the Soviet Navy
23. Importance of specialization and technical training
24. One man command
25. Political growth and discipline in the military
26. The USSR pursues a program of peace
27. The danger of West German rearmament; Bonn
Revanchism
28. Massive retaliation if attacked--total nuclear war
29. Reaction to the US policy of encirclement
30. The preeminent position of the USSR within the
socialist community

31. The importance of the Warsaw Pact
32. Lenin and his ideological influence as a special Patron of the Navy
33. The Strategic Rocket Forces as the main deterrent of imperialism
34. The necessity for balanced Armed Forces
35. The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy
36. US aircraft carriers and their obsolescence
37. The balanced navy concept
38. New qualitative measure of navy's effectiveness
39. The US has lost its naval supremacy
40. The "battle for the 1st salvo"
41. Importance of exercises
42. The basic unit of the navy is its cadre
43. The Soviet Union's difficult road to the sea
44. Limitations of major surface combatants
45. Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geographic environment
46. The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance
47. Brezhnev
48. Exploitation of the world's oceans--the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research
49. Soviet interest in the Mediterranean
50. Command and control

VII. PREDICTIONS

The following predictions are based upon a systematic analysis of Admiral Gorshkov's operational code, as well as a projection of the fifty most significant naval themes that the Admiral has advocated during his tour as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

1. The international mission of the Soviet Navy will expand greatly. Admiral Gorshkov's own words forecast that "further growth in the power of our navy will be characterized by an intensification of its international mission (101:64)." The "plenipotentiary role," the use of the Navy as a "diplomatic tool," and as a "stabilizing influence" in the international community are all important pluses for Admiral Gorshkov's campaign to establish the Soviet Navy as the Soviet Union's "most flexible instrument of foreign policy." The significance of this theme has increased 25% in recent years.

2. The "long cruise" and "out-of-area-operations" will continue to increase in frequency. Admiral Gorshkov perceives that "long cruises are schools in seamanship." Gorshkov constantly asserts that the Soviet Navy will maintain a presence in "all the oceans of the world." He has cited with great pride the cruises of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean Sea, the Caribbean Sea, the Indian Ocean, all areas of the Atlantic and Pacific including the coasts

of China, Africa, and Latin America, plus the Arctic and Antarctic Oceans. This theme is consistent, but has increased 7% in recent years.

3. As Soviet out-of-area-operations expand, so will pressure to obtain overseas bases. Gorshkov has long envied the US and British system of forward bases. But he is caught in the dilemma of Soviet "non-interference" with overseas countries. The Admiral tries to reduce the effect of this dilemma by lobbying for "better seakeeping capabilities," but the dilemma will become even more critical with the forward deployment of the KIEV "large-ASW-ship." Ultimately, the Soviets are going to have to obtain access to forward bases for their Navy, Merchant Marine, Fishing Fleet, and Ocean Research vessels. Their present propensity toward at-sea anchorages will prove insufficient.

4. Training and large scale exercises will continue to increase. Operations like "Sever," "OKEAN," and joint WARSAW Pact exercises will expand. Gorshkov believes that large scale training exercises most closely parallel combat. The "rhythm" of planning and training is important to fleet readiness (60:E3). The harsh conditions of training can reveal flaws in planning which then can be corrected. Gorshkov demands that training parallel the combat environment. The significance of this theme has increased in recent years.

5. The WARSAW Pact will be strengthened and joint operations among the navies of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria,

Romania, East Germany, and Poland will be stressed and encouraged (101:64). The WARSAW Pact will serve as a vehicle to advance two important Soviet interests: 1) the joint defense of the socialist community against the US and NATO, and 2) a lever by which to implement the Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet supremacy within the socialist community. The incidence of the WARSAW Pact theme has increased 26% in recent years.

6. Gorshkov's fear of West German rearmament is declining and will continue to do so. Ostpolitik and Detente have contributed to stabilize this area of Soviet paranoia. From a theme of vital significance under Krushchev, the fear of West German rearmament has decreased and has been mentioned only once since 1969. The theme is still present, but in much reduced emphasis.

7. The Soviet Union is going to push for a nuclear free Mediterranean and, ultimately, a military-free Mediterranean. The Soviets have more to gain from the exclusion of the US Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean than from the expulsion of their Mediterranean Squadron. This ploy might run counter to their "historic right to sail in the Mediterranean," but would not disallow their penetration of the area by other means: e.g. merchant ships, fishing vessels, air assault in crisis, etc.. Geography plays a major role in this prediction. This theme has appeared only under Brezhnev but is a new theme of projected top priority.

8. Technology will continue to be stressed in the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov is an inveterate innovator. He is very receptive to new technologies related to electronics, electro-optics, satellite ocean surveillance systems, laser weapons and communications, and computerized automation. Quality, not quantity, will remain the cornerstone of the Soviet Navy. Finally, the Admiral will ensure that no "gaps" appear between technology, naval science, and warfare tactics.

9. The tactics of the Soviet Navy will include surprise attack. Admiral Gorshkov believes that "the first salvo" is a necessary condition for victory at sea. The Admiral has stressed the importance of command and control to support such operations. The Admiral particularly emphasizes the modernization of submarine communications.

10. The Soviet Naval offensive strategic mission primarily will emphasize land targets. The missile range of the Delta class nuclear ballistic submarine corresponds with the new emphasis in targeting stated by Gorshkov in 1974. "The chief (strategic) purpose of a navy is now becoming action against land-based targets (113:A3)."

11. The submarine will remain the "basic unit of the Soviet Navy." New ballistic missile submarines will be designed to follow the Delta class SSBN. Gorshkov believes that nuclear submarines are "the perfect ship;" "that arm of the service which most fully incorporates the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress (113:A3)."

Gorshkov states that SLBM's have better survivability than land-launched ICBM's and, therefore, present a better deterrent posture.

Gorshkov will modernize his submarine force with multi-purpose missiles (SSN-X-13's) and sublaunched cruise missiles (SSN-X-15/16). New Soviet SSGN's and SSN's will provide front line strategic defense and sea denial against US aircraft carriers and NATO task forces. New SSN's will execute strategic defense against the threat of Polaris, Poseidan, and Trident SSBN's.

Finally, the Admiral envisions an anti-ASW support package for his own SSBN force. This support can best be provided by the new KIEV class sea control ship.

12. Gorshkov implicitly forecasts a sea control mission for the new KIEV class ASW/VSTOL aircraft carrier. Admiral Gorshkov defines sea control as "Achieving superiority of forces over the enemy in the main sector and to pin him down in the secondary sectors at the time of operations in a theater or sector of a theater (94:53)." To Gorshkov, sea control is "a dynamic holding action." The sea control ship that he will designate to perform this mission is the KIEV "large-ASW-ship." The KIEV will not function as an attack carrier, but rather provide at-sea strategic defense (with its VSTOL aircraft); submarine support and anti-ASW protection for Soviet submarines; and serve as a "projector" of Soviet sea presence in the international arena.

13. Admiral Gorshkov does not predict a foreseeable solution to the ASW problem. He will continue to develop special mission surface ships and ASW patrol aircraft with "cruise missile ASW weapons." The Admiral contends that nuclear submarines "are also becoming valuable anti-submarines, capable of detecting and destroying the enemy's missile carrying submarines (99:62)." He perceives the "cruise missile as the most effective ASW weapon (101:4)." But the Admiral sums up his position on ASW by comparing the present situation to World War II. He wonders aloud "since ASW forces which were so numerous and technically up to date, possessing vast superiority, turned out to be capable of only partially limiting the operations of diesel submarines, then what must this superiority be today in order to combat nuclear-powered submarines whose combat capabilities are far superior (97:59)." In short, the Admiral will continue to work on the ASW problem because it is so serious, but for him the area remains an unsolvable threat.

14. Soviet Naval Aviation is right behind submarines in Admiral Gorshkov's list of priorities. The new Backfire supersonic bomber will be fitted with long range air-to-surface cruise missiles in order to provide strategic defense against US naval forces; whether those forces be deployed at sea or remain at anchorage. The KIEV's new VSTOL aircraft will be equipped with both Harpoon type anti-shipping missiles and ASW cruise missiles. New ASW helicopters and long range patrol aircraft will be

developed to extend further the perimeter of Soviet strategic defense. In time of war, Admiral Gorshkov believes that Soviet Naval Aviation will be "the number one defense force of Soviet sea lines of communication."

15. Soviet surface ships will be built with mission-specific characteristics relating to strategic defense. General purpose ships will not be built. Quality and technological advancement will override quantity considerations. These surface ships (e.g. KARA, KRIVAK, KIEV, and their follow-ons) will be employed to fulfill the Soviet's definition of "sea control:" not the US definition of sea denial! The surface fleet will serve as a balance to the submarine force and will provide protection for the Soviet SSBN's and SSGN's. The Admiral always has supported a "balanced force" and will continue to do so, but he also will continue to give maximum priority to nuclear submarines.

16. The Soviet Union will expand its effort to integrate its sea power forces. The Merchant Marine, Oceanographic Research ships, and the Fishing Fleet will be able to project Soviet influence where its Navy cannot. The goals of the integration of Soviet sea power will be the economic exploitation of the world's oceans and the political penetration of the Third World. The Soviet Union will strive to keep a low profile in this process and to scrupulously obey international law. The Soviet Union will pursue an "open oceans" policy (with notable exceptions), lobby for a 12 mile international boundary limit, and press

for the exclusion of military use of the seabed. The integration of Soviet sea power is a new theme, but it is receiving tremendous emphasis.

17. The Soviet Navy will not be used in direct support of local wars which could involve direct confrontation with the US. Gorshkov recognizes the danger of local wars escalating into general war (99:63). The Soviet leadership would have grave reservations about their ability to "control" such a situation. The Soviet Navy will not participate in overt military actions against the US Navy short of nuclear war.

VIII. APPENDICES

A. APPENDIX A

This appendix is an itemized illustration of the thematic analysis outlined in Section VI. A standard format is employed in the presentation of each of the fifty theme categories presented. This format is explained below:

Theme #. (The theme number is an arbitrary numerical assignment stemming from the chronology of the theme category's first appearance. These numbers do not reflect ranking, and are used for organizational purposes only.)

Main theme category: (This phrase or title indicates the most encompassingly descriptive symbol of Gorshkov's public comments relating to a specific area of interest.)

Related themes: (Related themes represent a family of similar perceptions which are closely aligned with the central intent of the main theme category.)

First Appearance: (The date of the first significant appearance of the theme category.)

Last Appearance: (The date of the last significant appearance of the theme category.)

Statistics: (All statistics are listed in percentage figures.)

Overall frequency: (The number of appearances of a theme category recorded by document count/divided by the entire sample size: 113 documents.)

Krushchev: (The number of appearances of a theme category during the Krushchev era/the number of opportunities for the appearance of a theme in the Krushchev era: 34 documents.)

Brezhnev: (The number of appearances of a theme category during the Brezhnev era/the number of opportunities for the appearance of a theme in the Brezhnev era: 79 documents.)

% increase/decrease: (This figure will reflect the net difference between the frequency of appearance of a theme category in the Krushchev period from that of the Brezhnev period. The direction of that net change also is noted.)

Comments: (General background information or interesting supportive facts concerning a specific theme category.)

Representative quotations: (Document #: page #.)

A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF MAIN THEME CATEGORIES:

Theme #.

- 1.. The historical tradition of the Soviet Navy
2. Guarding the maritime borders of the USSR and the labors of communism
3. The leadership of the CPSU
4. The special relationship of the KOMSOMOL and the Soviet Navy
5. Cooperation of the Navy with other branches of the Armed Forces
6. The Soviet Union is not only a great continental land power, but also a great naval power
7. The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet interests at sea
8. The development of Soviet Naval Science
9. All Armed Forces and the entire populace must contribute to ensure victory
10. The technological revolution and its consequences
11. Reference to the Minister of Defense
12. The USSR cannot be a world power without a strong Navy
13. Krushchev and his position as a patron of the Navy
14. Proletarian Internationalism
15. The importance of long cruises
16. Socialist Competition
17. Training must parallel combat conditions
18. View of the enemy
19. Lenin's industrial program
20. The ultimate triumph of communism

21. Soviet naval mission= defend the sea frontiers
(strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces at sea
(same) + strike blows against targets in distant continents (strategic offense)
22. The international mission of the Soviet Navy
23. Importance of specialization and technical training
24. One man command
25. Political growth and discipline in the military
26. The USSR pursues a program of peace
27. The danger of West German rearmament; Bonn Revanchism
28. Massive retaliation if attacked--total nuclear war
29. Reaction to the US policy of encirclement
30. The preeminent position of the USSR within the socialist community
31. The importance of the Warsaw Pact
32. Lenin and his ideological influence as a special Patron of the Navy
33. The Strategic Rocket Forces as the main deterrent of imperialism
34. The necessity for balanced Armed Forces
35. The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy
36. US aircraft carriers and their obsolescence
37. The balanced navy concept
38. New qualitative measure of a navy's effectiveness
39. The US has lost its naval supremacy
40. The "battle for the 1st salvo"
41. Importance of exercises

42. The basic unit of the navy is its cadre
43. The Soviet Union's difficult road to the sea
44. Limitations of major surface combatants
45. Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geographic environment
46. The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance
47. Brezhnev
48. Exploitation of the world's oceans--the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research
49. Soviet interest in the Mediterranean
50. Command and control

Theme 1.

Main theme category: The historical tradition of the Soviet Navy

Related themes: the Russian history of sea power and exploration, the Soviet naval tradition from the October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War, the importance of tradition in propaganda for new cadres

First Appearance: July 27, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 46%

Krushchev: 44%

Brezhnev: 46%

% increase/decrease: +2%

Comments: This consistent theme is vital to Admiral Gorshkov's belief system, and reflects the intense historical prospective with which he views the rise of Soviet sea power.

Representative quotations: (26:CC2); (27:CC1); (91:53-62); (99:66)

Theme 2.

Main theme category: Guarding the maritime borders of the USSR and the labors of communism

Related themes: Frontline sea defense of the entire socialist community

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: August 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 32%

Krushchev: 24%

Brezhnev: 35%

% increase/decrease: +11%

Comments: This theme is the forerunner of the strategic defense mission of the Soviet Navy. The theme has been important in the past, but has received particular emphasis in recent years. Strategic defense has been a vital theme since 1968.

Representative quotations: (34:CC13); (44:1); (79:2)

Theme 3.

Main theme category: The leadership of the CPSU

Related themes: leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the role of the CPSU in determining the "correct path" for the Party and the Navy, the importance of the various Congresses of the CPSU, the patronage and leadership of the Party with respect to the Navy

First Appearance: July 27, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 55%

Krushchev: 62%

Brezhnev: 52%

% increase/decrease: -10%

Comments: Gorshkov has always legitimized his public statements with reference to the CPSU. He perceives the CC of the CPSU as the center of decision-making for Soviet policy.

However, after Gorshkov solidified his own political base during the Krushchev period, he has placed less emphasis on the benediction of the Party for all his public statements.

But overall, Gorshkov recognizes the importance and the primacy of the Party in all significant policy matters.

Therefore, the leadership of the CPSU is still a vital theme in all of Gorshkov's major addresses.

Representative quotations: (49:7); (93:223); (94:49); (99:57 & 66)

Theme 4.

Main theme category: The special relationship of the KOMSOMOL and the Soviet Navy

Related themes: the training that the KOMSOMOL provides Soviet seamen

First Appearance: July 27, 1955

Last Appearance: August 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 20%

Krushchev: 27%

Brezhnev: 17%

% increase/decrease: -10%

Comments: Gorshkov often alludes to the patronage of the KOMSOMOL by the Navy, and he takes great pride that 90% of all sailors are either KOMSOMOL members or communists. This theme has decreased in recent years as Gorshkov has found less reason to politically justify his every move.

Representative quotations: (33:CC3); (88:1)

Theme 5.

Main theme category: Cooperation of the Navy with other branches of the Armed Forces

Related themes: "the faithful helper of the Army," the need for joint operations to ensure victory

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 36%

Krushchev: 50%

Brezhnev: 30%

% increase/decrease: -20%

Comments: Gorshkov used this theme as a political balance to his goal of increasing Soviet Naval prestige. This theme was vital under Krushchev, but is less important in recent years. Gorshkov most often uses this theme now when comparing the merits of the SRT and the Navy. He does believe that joint operations are critical in war, and this belief is readily apparent when he speaks of amphibious operations. Overall, this theme is a political tool which Gorshkov employs in order to broaden his political support among the other branches of the Armed Forces.

Representative quotations: (89:21); (94:54)

Theme 6.

Main theme category: The Soviet Union is not only a great continental land power, but also a great naval power

Related themes: the Soviet Navy is a true ocean-going fleet

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 25%

Krushchev: 21%

Brezhnev: 26%

% increase/decrease: +5%

Comments: In the early years, Gorshkov knew that the substance of this theme was hollow. But by 1963, the Admiral began to boast of the power of the Soviet Navy; particularly in reference to "long cruises" in all the oceans of the world. In recent years, Gorshkov has emphasized this theme, but always in the context of the "peaceful purposes" of the Soviet Navy. Soviet Naval "power" does not wash well with the Third World countries, and Gorshkov recognizes this nuance. On balance, the naval power of the Soviet Navy, in one form or another, is still a major theme in Gorshkov's public addresses.

Representative quotations: (90:28); (99:61-63)

Theme 7.

Main theme category: The Soviet Navy must defend Soviet interests at sea

Related themes: "all the socialist country's interests," and "in all the world's oceans" were added in recent years to the main theme

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 20%

Krushchev: 12%

Brezhnev: 24%

% increase/decrease: +12%

Comments: Soviet "interests at sea" is the operative phrase in this theme. But neither the USSR nor Admiral Gorshkov has defined clearly what these interests are. In any event, Soviet interest is a dynamic quality and varies with corresponding "opportunities." Soviet economic interests at sea are on the increase as indicated by the expansion of their merchant fleet and fishing industry. Another factor which affects the emphasis of this theme is Soviet perception of the Brezhnev doctrine and its linkage to the international mission of communism. In sum, the theme of Soviet "interests at sea" has risen from minor importance during the Krushchev era to major and increasing significance in contemporary times.

Representative quotations: (2:CC5); (15:1); (46:1); (96:62)

Theme 8.

Main theme category: The development of Soviet Naval Science

Related themes: tactics, "small war theory," Lenin's eight principles of strategy, the definition of sea control, the revolution of technology and nuclear weapons with respect to tactics, operational science

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 21%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 24%

% increase/decrease: +9%

Comments: This is the single most important theme of this entire analysis: not because of the priority which Gorshkov assigns it (only mid-range), but because this is the single best indicator of the ways in which the Admiral views modern war at sea. He speaks of small war theory, the theories of A.T. Mahan, the use of operations research and computers in the Navy, the importance of aviation and submarines, the problems of ASW, his concept of control of the sea and nuclear war, the new tactics that were developed as a result of nuclear weapons, the place of the aircraft carrier in modern war, the importance of local wars and the chances of Soviet participation in them, and numerous other topics. This theme is consistent throughout all Admiral Gorshkov's writings and has been on the increase in recent years.

Representative quotations: (41: throughout); (93:
throughout); (99: throughout); (102: 1 & 2)

Theme 9.

Main theme category: All Armed Forces and the entire populace must contribute to ensure victory

Related themes: war is linked to the people, the Armed Forces is linked to the people

First Appearance: July 24, 1955

Last Appearance: February 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 16%

Krushchev: 18%

Brezhnev: 15%

% increase/decrease: -3%

Comments: Gorshkov develops this theme to paraphrase the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. He uses the Soviet victory in World War II as a prime example of this theme. He also uses this theme to indicate the "integrated" character of the Soviet Armed Forces: they are a "composite of all the nationalities."

Representative quotations: (62:E7); (84:M2)

Theme 10.

Main theme category: The technological revolution and its consequences

Related themes: qualitative technical changes, the advent of rockets and nuclear weapons, the revolution of technical ocean exploitation

First Appearance: July 28, 1955

Last Appearance: August 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 60%

Krushchev: 52%

Brezhnev: 63%

% increase/decrease: +11%

Comments: This theme category is the second most important of all Gorshkov's public themes. Gorshkov perceives his Navy as a product of the technical revolution. Technology and scientific advancement are intermixed in a vast majority of all his statements. He glorifies in "Sputnik," the atomic submarine, the science of naval operations, and in the technical revolution itself.

Representative quotations: (20:1); (24:18); (27:cc3); (41: throughout); (58:E3-4); (83:1-2); (104:1)

Theme 11.

Main theme category: Reference to the Minister of Defense

Related themes: None

First Appearance: July 28, 1956--Malinovskiy, December 1967--
Grechko

Last Appearance: July 29, 1962--Malinovskiy; March 1974--
Grechko

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 7%

Krushchev: 12% (Malinovskiy)

Brezhnev: 5% (Grechko)

% increase/decrease: -7%

Comments: This theme is important because the Minister of Defense is Admiral Gorshkov's direct superior in the Ministry of Defense. In the early years, Gorshkov often referenced remarks of Minister Malinovskiy. But in recent years, as Gorshkov has solidified his political position, the Admiral has been less verbose in his recognition of the Minister of Defense. The major exception to the decline of this theme was the reference to and quotations of Marshall Grechko in the "Navies in War and Peace" series. Also in 1974, Admiral Gorshkov has made several references to his own position within the Ministry of Defense. He has spoken of the Armed Forces generally, and not limited his remarks to the navy exclusively. However, this theme has not been a major objective in Admiral Gorshkov's speeches over the years.

Representative quotations: (9:CC9); (16:1); (95:57); (96:63);
(106:43)

Theme 12.

Main theme category: The USSR cannot be a world power without a strong Navy

Related themes: the historic importance of navies as a tool of major powers

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: December 1972

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 11%

Krushchev: 3%

Brezhnev: 14%

% increase/decrease: +11%

Comments: Gorshkov first used this theme under Krushchev as a tool for developing his navy. Under Brezhnev the power of the Soviet Navy had become a reality. Gorshkov quotes historic examples of the importance of a strong navy for both peace and wartime uses. He contends that the ocean will be the decisive battle-ground in modern warfare. He cites Peter the Great's famous quotation: "Every potentate who has only ground forces has only one hand; yet whoever has a navy too, has both hands." This theme has increased to a marked degree in recent years.

Representative quotations: (41:1-3); (73:1); (89:20); (92:48); (92:56-57); (98:59-60)

Theme 13.

Main theme category: Krushchev and his position as a patron of the Navy

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 31, 1964

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 39%

Krushchev: 39%

Brezhnev: N/A

% increase/decrease: N/A

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov's references to Krushchev present an interesting irony. The Admiral used the Krushchev imperator even though Krushchev was one of the foremost critiques of Gorshkov's balanced fleet concept. Krushchev would have pared the Soviet Navy to submarines only; yet Gorshkov needed Krushchev's political support in order to increase the support of the Navy. On balance, the Krushchev theme was critical to the Admiral's objectives in the early 1960's. By 1964, Admiral Gorshkov had been able to acquire Krushchev's implicit recognition of the need for a diverse, well-integrated naval force. If one compares the frequency of the Krushchev theme to that of the Brezhnev theme, it becomes apparent that Krushchev's political support was more important to Admiral Gorshkov than Brezhnev's backing is now. Representative quotations: (5:2); (15:32); (18:CC1); (26:CC3)

Theme 14.

Main theme category: Proletarian Internationalism

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: April 16, 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 4%

Krushchev: 3%

Brezhnev: 4%

% increase/decrease: +1%

Comments: Gorshkov utilizes this theme in building the ideological content of his public statements. He contends that this theme is one of the basic factors behind the Soviet Union's rationale for the international mission for her navy. He uses this theme to cement the common interests of the Soviet Union with those of the Warsaw Pact. However, this theme has been of minor consequences by itself and usually is combined with other communist philosophic beliefs to form an ideological base for Gorshkov's programs.

Representative quotations: (62:E8); (101:63)

Theme 15.

Main theme category: The importance of long cruises

Related themes: Training during long voyages, the importance of seakeeping-capabilities

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 37%

Krushchev: 32%

Brezhnev: 39%

% increase/decrease: +7%

Comments: This theme is one of Gorshkov's central naval postulates. The Admiral has pushed long cruises as "the main school of seamanship" under both Krushchev and Brezhnev. He takes great pride in Soviet out-of-area operations, and he contends that this part of Soviet operations will increase in the future. The Admiral believes that "Each of the thousands of miles traveled by (Soviet) ships was ably used for combat training." He contends that long cruises will reveal flaws in naval tactics which then can be corrected quickly and effectively. "Long cruises" has always been a major theme in Gorshkov's addresses and has received even more emphasis since 1963.

Representative quotations: (60:E2); (67:E1); (76:1); (80:M2); (99:64); (109:V5)

Theme 16.

Main theme category: Socialist Competition

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 15%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 15%

% increase/decrease: No change

Comments: This is another ideological term like proletarian internationalism that Gorshkov employs to validate his public statements. This theme is often used in response to CPSU Congress programs which require sacrifices and support by the Navy. The North Sea sailors use the motto: "Know and Maintain Weapons and Combat Equipment Well, and Master Them Skillfully." The socialist competition theme is used to exhort the Navy to greater heights of professionalism and political zeal. This phase seems to be a favorite of Gorshkov's, and he has used it consistently throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Representative quotations: (43:20); (62:E9); (67:E3); (101:65); (102:3); (103:23); (113:A5)

Theme 17.

Main theme category: Training must parallel combat conditions

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: February 20, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 18%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 19%

% increase/decrease: +4%

Comments: This theme category is closely allied with Gorshkov's belief in the importance of long cruises, training in specialized areas, and political indoctrination. He contends that each of these approaches will increase discipline and combat readiness. The Admiral believes that training under harsh sea conditions will reveal errors in naval tactics. He perceives benefit in operating in the difficult environment of "the Arctic, the oppressive heat of equatorial regions, and under the stress of long periods at sea." The Admiral believes that training must be "rhythmic" and in phase with planning. He sees this planning-training cyclic process as a close peacetime model of real combat operations. He visualizes each commanding officer as personally responsible for ensuring that all training parallel combat conditions. This theme has been consistent in both the Krushchev and Brezhnev eras.

Representative quotations: (44:1); (59:E6); (60:E3);
(101:62); (102:2-3)

Theme 18.

Main theme category: View of the enemy

Related themes: Perception of the US, of NATO, of imperialism, of capitalism, of the US Navy, of West German Revanchism

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 66%

Krushchev: 70%

Brezhnev: 64%

% increase/decrease: -6%

Comments: This is the second most pronounced theme in Gorshkov's public statements. He consistently views the US and its navy as the prime sources of conflict in the international arena. He perceives the US as the foremost imperialist power and its navy as a "policeman's stick" for executing its ill will. He decries US intervention in Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Europe. He views NATO as a direct threat to peace in Europe. He would free the sea-bed and the Mediterranean from all military uses. And the Admiral warns of US plans for massive ocean exploitation. In sum, the Admiral believes the political universe to exist in a state of intense conflict, and the US is the primary source of that conflict. In recent years, the Admiral has perceptibly moderated his rhetoric, but his basic belief of hostility toward the US and its allies is still present.

Representative quotations: (43:19); (49:9-11); (75:24); (77:4); (81:2-3); (91:55); (109:V4-V5)

Theme 19.

Main theme category: Lenin's industrial program

Related themes: Economy+industry+science=material base= naval base, the "navy is the most graphic indicator of industrial progress," Armed Forces are dependent on the economy of the state

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 23%

Krushchev: 18%

Brezhnev: 25%

% increase/decrease: +7%

Comments: Gorshkov uses this theme as the basis for Soviet naval development. All Soviet industrial progress is based upon Lenin's model. Once a state's economy has been developed, its technology and science advanced, and its material base assured, then that state can begin to consider a strong military force. Gorshkov believes that the most graphic indicator of a state's industrial progress is its navy. All great world powers have possessed large navies. Gorshkov contends that the CPSU carefully monitors the Soviet material base through the use of Lenin's industrial program. Only the Party can make all the correct decisions to ensure the effective execution of Lenin's program. As the technology of the Soviet navy has advanced in recent years, Gorshkov has become more reliant on this theme as the developmental "process" of the Soviet Navy.

Representative quotations: (6:1); (24:6 & 18); (26:CC2);
(98:58 & 59); (111:V2)

Theme 20.

Main theme category: The ultimate triumph of communism

Related Themes: The invincible form of the Soviet state and the Soviet social order, the invincible nature of the Soviet Armed Forces

First Appearance: May 9, 1958

Last Appearance: May 9, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 14%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 14%

% increase/decrease: -1%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov is confident of the ultimate triumph of communism and the invincible status of the Soviet Armed Forces. He contends that World War II changed the balance of the international system in favor of communism. He believes that World War II and the Soviet Union provided the opportunity for third world countries to throw off the yoke of colonial imperialism and to pursue socialism through "just wars of liberation." The Admiral believes that communism will triumph in the end, but as long as capitalism is allowed to exist, the seeds of conflict will still be present. This theme has been consistent throughout the 19 years of public statements analyzed.

Representative quotations: (19:29); (24:15); (49:9); (62:E8); (77:4); (109:V4)

Theme 21.

Main theme category: Soviet naval mission=defend the sea frontiers (strategic defense) + destroy enemy naval forces at sea (same) + strike blows against targets in distant continents (strategic offense)

Related themes: Naval mission in nuclear war, naval mission in local wars, wartime mission in general

First Appearance: July 27, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 30%

Krushchev: 32%

Brezhnev: 30%

% increase/decrease: -2%

Comments: The mission of the Soviet navy has moved from strategic defense in the early Gorshkov years, to strategic offense against land targets in recent years. The broad definition of the Soviet wartime mission has not changed, but the capability of the Soviet navy to perform its tasks has increased greatly. In early years, Gorshkov talked about "blunting the aggressor's blow." He worried about extending the defense perimeter to sea in order to counter the US aircraft carriers and Polaris submarines. Now he believes that the chief purpose of his navy is to strike land targets in distant continents. He contends that he can now "execute any mission on the world's oceans" which he is ordered to do. He believes that his nuclear

ballistic submarines have better survivability than land based ICBM's and hence are a better deterrent. Gorshkov's perception of the Soviet Naval mission has not changed, but his tools have.

Representative quotations: (56:1-2); (58:E4); (63:E3-4); (69:1); (113:A3-4)

Theme 22.

Main theme category: The international mission of the Soviet Navy

Related themes: The diplomatic uses of a navy, its plenipotentiary role, gunboat diplomacy, stabilizing influence in the international arena, symbol of mutual understanding, etc.

First Appearance: February 23, 1959

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 41%

Krushchev: 23%

Brezhnev: 48%

% increase/decrease: +25%

Comments: The international mission of the Soviet Navy is the important theme of Gorshkov's public statements in recent years. This theme has increased 25% in frequency during the last 9 years. Gorshkov forecasts "that any increase in Soviet naval power in future years will be related to its international mission. Gorshkov is fond of pointing to the fact that navies can achieve political objectives without resorting to confrontation or military operations. He cites historical examples of periods when Russia lost the diplomatic initiative because she had a weak navy. He points to the fact that a strong Soviet Navy will have a stabilizing influence in peacetime, and such a navy would increase international understanding and good will. Gorshkov perceives the Soviet Navy as the

most flexible arm of Soviet foreign policy. The importance of this theme cannot be overstressed.

Representative quotations: (33:CC3); (63:E5); (65:E6);
(71:E4); (74:E3-4); (89:21-22); (91:53-54); (98:59);
(98:64); (101:64); (111:V2)

Theme 23.

Main theme category: Importance of specialization and technical training

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 23, 1959

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 11%

% increase/decrease: -4%

Comments: This theme is tied in with the technical revolution which so greatly affected naval development. The Admiral believes that the only solution to keeping abreast of technology is massive training in specialized areas.

He is proud of the fact that over 90% of his sailors are trained specialists. This theme has been consistent over the years and indicates Gorshkov's intense interest in modernization and maximized utilization of all personnel.

Representative quotations: (9:CC9-10); (53:63); (67:E3); (101:65)

Theme 24.

Main theme category: One man command

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 23, 1959

Last Appearance: Late 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 10%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 8%

% increase/decrease: -7%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov noted the importance of one-man control in an article in 1963. He devoted an entire article to this concept in late 1973 entitled "Ship's Commanding Officer." Gorshkov is a firm believer in leadership-by-one-person as opposed to the earlier "dual command" system under which orders of the C.O. required the counter-signature of the deputy commander for political matters. Gorshkov believes that one man control clearly defines responsibility.

Representative quotations: (9:CC10-12); (24:25);

(105:throughout)

Theme 25.

Main theme category: Political growth and discipline
in the military

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 23, 1959

Last Appearance: July 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 17%

Krushchev: 32%

Brezhnev: 10%

% increase/decrease: +22%

Comments: This theme was very prevalent during the Krushchev era, but has been reduced in recent years. Gorshkov used to contend that the strength of a military unit was its political organization. He believed that discipline could be achieved through political indoctrination. He still holds this same belief, but it has been greatly reduced in recent years. Now he stresses training and specialization to achieve the same ends.

Representative quotations: (33:CC3); (44:1); (49:13);
(101:63)

Theme 26.

Main theme category: The USSR pursues a program of peace

Related themes: Peaceful coexistence, Detente, SALT, negotiations, Law of the Sea conferences, Test Ban Treaty, peace missions, compliance with international law

First Appearance: July 26, 1959

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 27%

Krushchev: 29%

Brezhnev: 27%

% increase/decrease: -2%

Comments: This is a major theme in all Gorshkov's statements. He contends that nuclear war is not inevitable, and that as Soviet might increases, the likelihood of war decreases. He believes that "the new stage of communism" requires peace and that peaceful coexistence and detente are the ways to obtain it. He backs SALT, negotiations for the control of the sea bed, and international boundary limits. He stresses the peaceful mission of the Soviet Navy and its careful compliance with international law. He states that the Soviet Navy is an instrument of stabilization in the international arena. In sum, the Admiral believes in a policy of peace to reduce international tension, but that that policy must be backed by strength.

Representative quotations: (30:CC2); (42:4); (46:1); (62:E8-9); (74:E4); (81:1); (81:2-3); (99:62); (110:1-2); (111:V2); (113:A3-4)

Theme 27.

Main theme category: The danger of West German rearmament;
Bonn Revanchism

Related themes: None

First Appearance: July 26, 1959

Last Appearance: December 1972

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 13%

Krushchev: 24%

Brezhnev: 8%

% increase/decrease: -16%

Comments: This was a major theme under Krushchev. The Russian fear of German rearmament was very pronounced until their initiation of Ost Politik. Gorshkov was very fearful that the US would give Bonn nuclear weapons. He made a major speech in 1964 attacking the idea of multinational, "chameleon-warships" armed with nuclear weapons. He saw the US plan of multinational NATO ships as a ploy to rearm West Germany with nuclear weapons. He called this program "a return to the policy of Dulles of balancing on the brink of war." This theme appeared as a major objective in Gorshkov's speeches twelve times from July 1964 to May 1969 (31%). This theme has only been mentioned once since May 1969. The theme was present once in the "Navies in War and Peace" series, but has been all but dismissed recently. Representative quotations: (28: throughout); (62:E9); (98:62)

Theme 28.

Main theme category: Massive retaliation if attacked--
total nuclear war

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 2, 1962

Last Appearance: July 1972

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 26%

Brezhnev: 6%

% increase/decrease: -20%

Comments: The policy of massive retaliation was prevalent under Krushchev. In recent years, it has been replaced with more subtle deterrent methodologies. Gorshkov first talked about massive retaliation in connection with the "Caribbean Crisis." In 1963, he spoke of the USSR's unified strategy on nuclear weapons use. By 1964, he stated that all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces possessed nuclear weapons. But by 1969, his rhetoric concerning nuclear war began to cool. He still exclaimed the power of his ballistic missile submarines and his cruise missile armed Soviet Naval Aviation, but he spoke more in technical terms than in threatening terms. Gorshkov has no questions concerning massive Soviet response to US aggression, but this theme has mellowed in recent years.

Representative quotations: (15:1); (16:1) (19:28); (21:15); (24:10-11); (53:62); (63:E3-4); (68:1)

Theme 29.

Main theme category: Reaction to the US policy of encirclement

Related themes: "The ring of fire"

First Appearance: February 2, 1962

Last Appearance: February 20, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 7%

Krushchev: 8%

Brezhnev: 6%

% increase/decrease: -2%

Comments: Gorshkov has always worried about the NATO encirclement of the socialist block. This is one of the primary reasons why he calls for a nuclear free Mediterranean. He contends that the best way to break this "ring of fire" is to extend the Soviet defense perimeter farther to sea. The Admiral believes that cooperation with Warsaw Pact navies will also tend to reduce the effectiveness of the US encirclement. In any event, this theme is a minor one in Gorshkov's total public sample, but it does combine issues of many of his major themes. (e.g. cooperation, strategic defense, etc.)

Representative quotations: (11:CC9); (21:15-16); (98:62)

Theme 30.

Main theme category: The preeminent position of the USSR within the socialist community

Related themes: Brezhnev Doctrine

First Appearance: February 23, 1960

Last Appearance: May 9, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 6%

Krushchev: 8%

Brezhnev: 5%

% increase/decrease: -3%

Comments: Gorshkov has used this theme to indicate the position of responsibility that the USSR possesses within the socialist community. He has been careful not to use this theme as a threat against other Warsaw Pact countries, but rather as an ideological truism. Gorshkov believes that it is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to ensure the ideological purity of the socialist system. In 1971, he paraphrased the Brezhnev Doctrine in calling the Soviet Union the first socialist state in the world. He quotes Lenin in claiming that the preeminence of the Soviet Union must be recognized. He claims that the aggressive policies of the People's Republic of China are anti-socialist. In terms of ideological significance, this theme is important indeed.

Representative quotations: (12:CC2-3); (22:CC20-22); (24:27); (81:3); (101:64-65); (109:V5)

Theme 31.

Main theme category: The importance of the Warsaw Pact

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 23, 1960

Last Appearance: February 23, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 27%

Krushchev: 8%

Brezhnev: 34%

% increase/decrease: +26%

Comments: This theme has received tremendous emphasis since 1964. Gorshkov believes in the importance of combined/joint exercises with the Warsaw Pact navies. This ploy not only solidifies the bond between the Soviet Union and its allies, but also extends the defense perimeter of the USSR seaward. Gorshkov perceives the Warsaw Pact as the best answer to NATO. Gorshkov believes that its members have a common ideology, the same purposes and problems, a belief in expanding internationalism, and respect for each other's national culture and traditions. He views the Warsaw Pact as a defensive alliance against the corruption of capitalism. This "corrupting influence" is the rationale for the Brezhnev Doctrine. In sum, the Warsaw Pact theme has been vital in Gorshkov statements in recent years. Gorshkov continues to emphasize this theme with an increasing number of joint Soviet-East European naval exercises.

Representative quotations: (27:CC4); (56:1-2); (86:3); (101:64)

Theme 32.

Main theme category: Lenin and his ideological influence as a special Patron of the Navy.

Related Themes: The Navy as the vanguard of the revolution, Lenin's Principles of Strategy, Naval science and Dialectical Materialism

First Appearance: February 20, 1958

Last Appearance: July 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 27%

Krushchev: 18%

Brezhnev: 32%

% increase/decrease: +14%

Comments: Gorshkov has taken great care to develop this theme in recent years. He has tried to document the prestige of the Navy based on Lenin's words and strategies. He quotes Lenin as saying "The Navy is the basic unit of the Armed Forces" and "The Navy is the vanguard of the revolution." Gorshkov quotes Lenin in order to justify an aggressive foreign policy based on military power in general and naval power in particular. He seems to use "The Leninist Principles of Military Science" to offset the political tactic of Detente. Lenin's strategies tend to strengthen his militant position. A hard line military position would be weakened if Detente were followed to its ultimate conclusion. In any event, Gorshkov has taken Lenin as his "patron saint" in recent years. He devotes an entire section of article

6/72 of "Navies in War and Peace" to discussing Lenin and his ideological influence on the military science. Representative quotations: (27:CC1); (63:E1); (75:19); (89:20); (93:223-4)

Theme 33.

Main theme category: The Strategic Rocket Forces as the main deterrent of imperialism

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 23, 1960

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 19%

Krushchev: 8%

Brezhnev: 23%

% increase/decrease: +15%

Comments: The SRT was not formed until 1960, so this theme did not appear before that date. Gorshkov contends that although the SRT was the main deterrent of the USSR, now the Soviet Navy ranks with coequal status. He cites the high survivability figure of ballistic submarines over land based ICBMs. Gorshkov argues that land nuclear missile can not do it all. He contends that these forces must be augmented by nuclear submarines and missile armed aircraft. He implicitly advocates the same triad concept that the US possesses. In any event, Gorshkov recognizes the importance of the SRT as a major strategic deterrent. He desires part of that same mission for his Navy.

Representative quotations: (50:1); (59:E5); (65:E5); (98:58); (99:63); (102:2); (107:24)

Theme 34.

Main theme category: The necessity for balanced Armed Forces

Related themes: Joint/Combined operations

First Appearance: February 23, 1960

Last Appearance: February 19, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 14%

Krushchev: 6%

Brezhnev: 18%

% increase/decrease: +12%

Comments: Gorshkov is a great adherent of balanced, co-operative armed forces. He cites the problems of World War II concerning amphibious operations as an example of the lack of balance. Another example during World War II was the lack of adequate air support for the naval forces. Gorshkov quotes Lenin in saying that victory can only be determined by a total effort of all the elements of the armed forces and the people. This theme has increased in significance in recent years as Gorshkov has lobbied for a "balanced navy." He uses many of the same arguments for a balanced navy as he does for a balanced armed forces. Representative quotations: (48:7); (85:1-2); (89:21); (99:66)

Theme 35.

Main theme category: The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy

Related themes: The decline in the value of surface ships

First Appearance: February 23, 1960

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 42%

Krushchev: 41%

Brezhnev: 42%

% increase/decrease: +1%

Comments: The submarine is the core of Admiral Gorshkov's Navy. He views the submarine as "a modern undersea cruiser," "the perfect ship," "and the highest form of technical advancement." He claims that nuclear ballistic submarines are the best and most effective deterrent against imperialist aggression. He states that submarines can completely strangle a state by cutting its lines of communication through barrier operations. He views the submarine as the number one ASW platform (and the only really effective one). He envisions a tremendous support package to add to submarine effectiveness. The Admiral believes that sea control can be obtained by Soviet submarines properly supported. He states that submarines have revolutionized naval science and warfare. In short, the submarine is the basis of Admiral Gorshkov's Navy. All else is collateral or supportive in the eyes of the Admiral.

Representative quotations: (14:1); (15:1); (16:1);
(17:1-2); (24:19-20); (30:CC1-2); (41:16-17); (50:1);
(100:M3); (113:A3)

Theme 36.

Main theme category: US aircraft carriers and their obsolescence

Related themes: Carriers cannot compare with nuclear submarines

First Appearance: July 31, 1960

Last Appearance: November 1972

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 9%

Krushchev: 15%

Brezhnev: 6%

% increase/decrease: -9%

Comments: Gorshkov has always recognized the effectiveness of US carriers in a limited war situation. He has tried to diminish their threat potential in a nuclear war, but nonetheless has taken strong measures to combat them. The important thing to note about Gorshkov's statements on aircraft carriers in recent years is what he has not said. He had de-emphasized this theme markedly since 1969. In 1967, Gorshkov was emphatic about the high vulnerability of aircraft carriers. But he was referring strictly to strike carriers--not sea control ships. In recent years, the Admiral has stressed the importance of naval aviation and its role as the number one defender of Soviet sea lines of communication in any future conflict. Gorshkov sees a very real place in his navy for a sea control type ship. The Moskva was the first cut, the Keiv the second, and

there will be future refinements. The Admiral has argued against carriers in the past, but he has modified his position and will continue to move toward a sea control concept to guard Soviet interests at sea, to support Soviet submarine operations, and to project Soviet sea power overseas.

Representative quotations: (41:1-3); (67:E2); (74:E3); (97:63)

Theme 37.

Main theme category: The balanced navy concept

Related themes: submarines cannot do it all

First Appearance: October 31, 1962

Last Appearance: May 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 26%

Krushchev: 29%

Brezhnev: 24%

% increase/decrease: -5%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov is an advocate of not only a balanced navy, but an integrated one as well. The Admiral believes that there must be even development among the submarine, naval aviation, surface, and amphibious forces in order to maximize the effectiveness of each. Further, he contends that the Navy must be balanced with the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and the Soviet oceanographic program. Gorshkov does state that certain forces within this complex should receive emphasis (e.g. submarines and naval aviation), but this emphasis should never be extended to the point of exclusion of any one sector. The Admiral does not specify in detail which forces should dominate, but rather that the entire naval complex should be balanced in order to perform any mission which the Party leadership assigns it. This balanced force will not be composed of general purpose ships, but rather mission specific ships which will readily integrate to accomplish the mission at

hand. This theme is a major naval theme to Admiral Gorshkov. .

Representative quotations: (41:19--definition); (75:22-23); (92:57-58); (94:51); (97:57-58)

Theme 38.

Main theme category: New qualitative measure of a navy's effectiveness

Related themes: None

First Appearance: July 29, 1962

Last Appearance: February 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 12%

Brezhnev: 12%

% increase/decrease: None

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov believes that the technical revolution has caused the necessity of a new measurement of naval effectiveness. The Mahan theory of sea power is no longer the complete answer because it does not consider qualitative improvements in naval hardware. Quality, not quantity, is not the main indicator of naval power. Admiral Gorshkov states that all Soviet naval advancement is based upon qualitative advances and, because of this fact, the Soviet navy has been able to close the "gap" between itself and the US navy.

Representative quotations: (16:1); (64:E2-3); (89:19); (91:54); (92:48)

Theme 39.

Main theme category: The US has lost its naval supremacy

Related themes: None

First Appearance: May 30, 1963

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 12%

Brezhnev: 12%

% increase/decrease: None

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has great respect for US seapower. When he first claimed that the US was not supreme at sea in 1963 his remarks were hollow: they are no longer. The Admiral claims that the Soviet Navy can perform its missions in its own areas of interest. He has never claimed a sea control mission for his navy; at least not in the same terms that the US Navy employs. Admiral Gorshkov states that the Soviet Navy has reached coequal status with the US Navy. He does not claim superiority to the US Navy in all areas. But the Admiral is now confident that his navy could hold its own in either a conventional or nuclear confrontation with the US Navy. He now has the hardware to back up such an assertion.

Representative quotations: (26:CC2); (47:1); (61:1)
(62:E8-9); (85:1-2)

Theme 40.

Main theme category: The "battle for the 1st salvo"

Related themes: Surprise attack

First Appearance: May 30, 1963

Last Appearance: February 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 11%

Krushchev: 3%

Brezhnev: 14%

% increase/decrease: +11%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov is an advocate of the initiative. He claims that the first moments in a modern battle at sea will go a long way to determining the final outcome of the conflict. He quotes Lenin concerning the importance of surprise. To Admiral Gorshkov, the battle for the first salvo is a necessary condition for ultimate victory.

Representative quotations: (35:CC6); (49:14); (93:224); (99:63)

Theme 41.

Main theme category: Importance of exercises

Related themes: Joint operations, realistic combat training

First Appearance: June 24, 1963

Last Appearance: April 6, 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 6%

Brezhnev: 15%

% increase/decrease: +9%

Comments: This theme has received increased emphasis in recent years. The Admiral points with pride to such operations as "Sever" and "Okean." He also states that World War II indicated the importance of large scale, joint exercises. Admiral Gorshkov believes that large scale exercises are an excellent way of modelling real combat conditions. He stresses the necessity of including the Warsaw Pact navies in such exercises. In sum, this theme has increased in recent years, and is likely to continue to do so.

Representative quotations: (55:1); (56:1-2); (67:E1); (74:E3); (75:26); (94:55); (98:64)

Theme 42.

Main theme category: The basic unit of the navy is its cadre

Related themes: Cadre training

First Appearance: July 1963

Last Appearance: February 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 16%

Krushchev: 9%

Brezhnev: 19%

% increase/decrease: +10%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov pays great tribute to the quality of Soviet sailors. He refers to them as his "gold fund." The Admiral makes reference to the recruiting and military draft problems encountered in the Soviet Union. He speaks of the racial integration of the Navy; combining elements of all the nationalities of the USSR. The Admiral takes great pride in the achievements of his sailors once they have returned to civilian life. He believes that the Navy has a special responsibility to train its cadre in ideology and technical skills. This theme has increased to a significant degree in recent years. The Admiral seems to be using this theme to "sell" the navy life to the Soviet citizenry.

Representative quotations: (24:13-14); (35:CC7); (60:E3); (98:63); (100:1); (102:5); (103:1)

Theme 43.

Main theme category: The Soviet Union's difficult road to the sea

Related themes: Leadership problems, geographical constraints

First Appearance: July 1963

Last Appearance: February 19, 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 8%

Krushchev: 3%

Brezhnev: 10%

% increase/decrease: +7%

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov points to the historic search for warm water ports by the USSR. He cites the historic destiny of Soviet access to the Mediterranean. He decries the misuse of the navy by the Tsar, by Soviet leaders during the 1930's (does not mention Stalin!), and by tacticians during the early 50's. The Admiral condemns false western propaganda which stated that Russia was a land power only. He admits the severe geographic constraints of maintaining separate fleets in the Baltic, the North Sea, the Mediterranean (Black) Sea, and the Pacific. But after all these problems, Gorshkov exclaims that the Soviet Navy has conquered them all and now is a first class ocean-going force. He has ample reason for such optimism.

Representative quotations: (24: throughout); (41: throughout); (81:2-3); (90: throughout)

Theme 44.

Main theme category: Limitations of major surface combatants

Related themes: Their replacement by submarines

First Appearance: July 1963

Last Appearance: July 29, 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: 6%

Brezhnev: 15%

% increase/decrease: +9%

Comments: Gorshkov does not so much argue against surface ships (for he has a very real need of them) as he points out their shortcomings. The Admiral points to the fact that surface ships were only effective in World War II when they possessed sufficient air cover. He states that the role of surface ships is primarily defensive. He points to the inherent weaknesses of surface ships as ASW platforms; even when they have tremendous numerical advantage. Gorshkov believes in mission specific ships rather than those which perform general missions. But the Admiral does have hope for surface combatants, particularly those which possess cruise missiles and nuclear rockets. He stated in 1974 that surface ships are now technically equal to submarines in terms of their equipment. This is the highest praise that the Admiral can award.

Representative quotations: (24:17); (38:CC3); (75:22-23); (92:52-53); (95:56); (97:57-60); (99:62-63); (104:1)

Theme 45.

Main theme category: Absence of Soviet foreign bases and their geographic environment.

Related themes: None

First Appearance: April 3, 1966

Last Appearance: April 6, 1973

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 8%

Krushchev: None

Brezhnev: 11%

% increase/decrease: New theme

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has long coveted the foreign bases of the US and British navies. No one recognizes the Soviet Union's geographic problems better than Admiral Gorshkov. He has cited the difficulty in transferring units from the North Sea Fleet to the Pacific Fleet via the North Sea route. He is very aware of the confines of the Turkist straits in time of international crisis. But the Admiral is up against a public policy of Soviet non-interference with foreign countries (outside the socialist community). The Admiral has stated that the avowed purpose of port visits is to show friendship and increase mutual understanding. But the Soviet Navy's activity in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean cannot expand much further without shore-related support facilities. The Admiral can solve the problem in the short term by improving Soviet seakeeping capabilities and underway

replenishment. But in the long run, the Soviet Navy must obtain foreign bases.

Representative quotations: (89:20); (90: throughout); (91:55 & 62); (92:49); (96:62); (99:58)

Theme 46.

Main theme category: The importance of readiness, mobility, and vigilance

Related themes: None

First Appearance: July 23, 1955

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 100%

Krushchev: 100%

Brezhnev: 100%

% increase/decrease: None

Comments: This theme appears implicitly or explicitly in all of Admiral Gorshkov's statements. This is the most vital and consistent theme of his public writings. The Admiral is intensely aware that the technological revolution leaves no room for indecision or delay. If there would be one theme that he could engrain in his navy, it would be readiness. The Admiral faces an enemy that is superior in numbers, in support, and in total firepower. Gorshkov believes that victory against such an enemy can only be achieved through initiative, surprise, and qualitative advantage. All Soviet naval weapons systems are designed to meet these criteria. Anti-shipping missiles, submarine launched cruise missiles, and air-launched guided missiles all conform with Gorshkov's plan to win the "battle for the first salvo." He is fanatical about requiring that all training parallel combat operations. Every Soviet sailor

is trained to respond instantly in the technical environment. The Admiral trains for a war which will be lost if vigilance is decreased for an instant. All of Admiral Gorshkov's speeches hammer these truths home.

Representative quotations: (Any document listed in the primary sources)

Theme 47.

Main theme category: Brezhnev

Related themes: The Brezhnev Doctrine

First Appearance: June 1967

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 16%

Krushchev: N/A

Brezhnev: 16%

% increase/decrease: N/A

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov mentioned Brezhnev in 16% of his public statements since Brezhnev assumed leadership of the USSR. Although Gorshkov first noted Brezhnev in June 1967, he did so in conjunction with Kosygin. The Admiral did not single out Brezhnev as the Soviet leader until May 1969.

Representative quotations: (43:20); (63:E9); (81:3); (90:37); (107:25)

Theme 48.

Main theme category: Exploitation of the world's oceans-- the merchant marine, the fishing fleet, and oceanographic research.

Related themes: None

First Appearance: July 1967

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 9%

Krushchev: N/A

Brezhnev: 13%

% increase/decrease: N/A

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has placed emphasis on this theme in recent years; particularly since July 1970. The Admiral believes in integrated sea power. The merchant marine can often penetrate areas which would be out of bounds to the Soviet Navy. The fishing fleet is a tremendous source of protein to the USSR. Ocean research has wide military application. Gorshkov contends that ocean exploitation will have great significance in coming years. He wants to ensure that the Soviet Union will lead in this new competition for world resources.

Representative quotations: (74:El); (89:20); (99: throughout)

Theme 49.

Main theme category: Soviet interest in the Mediterranean

Related themes: None

First Appearance: February 2, 1968

Last Appearance: July 1974

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 12%

Krushchev: N/A

Brezhnev: 18%

% increase/decrease: N/A

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov often cites the historic right of the Soviet Union to sail the Mediterranean. He desires to expell the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean grants access to the strategically sensitive southwest flank of the USSR. The Turkish straits present a particularly bothersome problem. Gorshkov believes that the first step in the solution to this problem is the negotiation of the Mediterranean as a free zone from nuclear weapons. Gorshkov's ultimate desire is a Mediterranean free from all military influence. If he is successful in his goal, the Soviet Union will have won the battle of the Mediterranean by default.

Representative quotations: (60:E2); (65:E5); (81:3); (90:29); (99:58); (110:1); (113:A4)

Theme 50.

Main theme category: Command and Control

Related themes: Communication and staff efficiency

First Appearance: June 6, 1968

Last Appearance: June 1972

Statistics:

Overall frequency: 4%

Krushchev: N/A

Brezhnev: 5%

% increase/decrease: N/A

Comments: Admiral Gorshkov has spoken of the importance of communications in modern warfare. He has cited the widespread use of radio/electronics and automation within the Soviet Navy. These remarks are most often connected with reference to nuclear ballistic submarines. This theme is important but of minor significance in terms of frequency of appearance.

Representative quotations: (54:E1); (55:1); (86:1);
(93:224)

APPENDIX B

This appendix contains the Category Reliability and Intercoder Reliability tests administered for this thesis. Reliability was measured in the following manner: 1) ten coders were selected to code the two sample documents included in this appendix; 2) five of these coders were selected from the Naval Intelligence Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, two coders were selected from other activities at the School, and three coders were selected with no connection with the Graduate School whatsoever; 3) a short briefing on coding requirements was given to each coder; 4) the coders were asked to perform the following operations--a) determine the main themes in sample #1, and determine if a set of given themes was present in sample #2; 5) mean averages were then calculated to determine intercoder reliability as well as category reliability. Intercoder Reliability was 92% and Category Reliability was 89%. The samples and related forms follow.

Please list the main theme categories that you believe to be present in the following excerpts on a separate sheet of paper....Thank you

Sample #1

Sample--Gorshkov Statement--

The youth of the navy is primarily its ability to keep up with scientific and technical progress. The navy as a whole and each of its ships individually reflect the economic might of the country, the level of its industrial development, the successes of its science and technology, and much else...

Nuclear-powered submarines have now come to the forefront as an arm of the service which has most fully incorporated the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress.

The navy had two main tasks: to counter the enemy's fleet and actions against the shore. The first of these tasks has had priority for many centuries. But since World War II the situation has begun to change. Judging by the development trend of navies and their weapons, the chief purpose of a navy is now becoming action against land-based targets...

By making long voyages, engaging in combat training, and fulfilling responsible tasks of safeguarding the Soviet Union's state interests and defending its sea borders our navy is a stabilizing factor making friendly countries confident of their security. Paying visits of friendship and good will to foreign ports, the ships of our navy are successfully fulfilling the noble mission of strengthening the friendship of the land of the Soviets with the peoples of many states and continents.

As a result of our victory, world imperialism was weakened but did not abandon its objective--the destruction of communism. Having regrouped their forces the imperialists have now launched preparation for a new world war under the guidance of the monopolies across the ocean and of the excessively militant circles who express their interests and with the assistance and support of the reactionary forces of the European countries. The creation of aggressive military blocs aimed against our country and the entire socialist community, the speeding of the arms race, the unleashing of numerous local wars and conflicts, nuclear blackmail and military provocations--these are the directions in which they are striving to direct the development of events in the world arena.

The strategic missile forces are being perfected. They are outfitted with weapons of tremendous destructive

power and high accuracy, and today they are the foundation of the USSR's military power.

...It entered history as a brilliant example of collaboration between the Soviet Army and Navy in achieving victory over the enemy. Joint operations between the Army and the Navy has developed historically as a traditional feature of our military and naval art.

Our combat ships have been created and continue to be created within the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, which has spread its impact over all aspects of military affairs.

Long voyages are schools in seamanship and should lay the foundation for combat training.

Main theme categories from Sample #1.

Sample #2

Heir to the combat and revolutionary traditions of the Russian and the Soviet Navy, the military sailors of our Motherland are fulfilling their sacred military obligation to the Communist Party and the people with honor and dignity. Together with all soldiers of the armed forces they are reliably protecting the peaceful, constructive work of the Soviet people and are serving vigilantly over the expanses of the seas and oceans.

Our people are forced to create the material-technical base of communism in the face of continual opposition from imperialist trying to slow down socialism's victory procession across the land by any means. In just the postwar years alone they have unleashed over 30 wars and armed conflicts of various scales.

In its Resolution the 24th Congress of the CPSU recorded with full justification that American imperialism is the greatest danger to the independence of peoples and to universal peace and is the main obstacle in the way of social progress. Aggressiveness in foreign policy and militaristic expansion, which carries the threat of world war, are typical of the USA.

Important events leading to a reduction in tension in various parts of the world have occurred and are now occurring as a result of the tremendous amount of work done by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet CPSU Congress. The most significant event was cessation of the war in Vietnam and the victory of the heroic Vietnamese people. Imperialism had retreated. But its aggressive nature remains as before and it continues to be the main source of wars and military conflicts. It threatens the safety of our country and the entire socialist fraternity. This is why our Communist Party at the same time expresses constant concern over fortifying the defense capabilities of the country, unwaveringly following the principles of peaceful coexistence in its relations with different states.

Along with other armed forces branches the Soviet Navy is also developing harmoniously. The most important feature inherent to our modern ocean fleet is the youngness of its ships and all the personnel. Our combat ships have been created and continue to be created within the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, which has spread its impact over all aspects of military affairs. Therefore together with an extensive and highly diverse arsenal of modern weapons and technical combat resources, the submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft concentrate the latest scientific and technical achievements within themselves and respond to the demands of modern naval warfare.

The equipment with which all of our ships are outfitted has made them quite independent of the distances and time involved in executing the mission imposed upon them. Today they are wherever necessary on the world's oceans for as long a time as is required.

Please indicate if the following themes were present in
Sample #2: Just place a check next to themes present---

1. The historic traditions of the Soviet Navy
2. The Soviet Union pursues a program of peace backed
by strength
3. The importance of technology and the scientific
revolution
4. The US is hostile to the USSR
5. The importance of the leadership of the CPSU
6. Krushchev is a special patron of the Navy
7. The ultimate triumph of communism
8. The Navy defends Soviet interest at sea
9. The "balanced" fleet concept
10. Cooperation with other branches of the armed forces
11. Exploitation of the world's ocean resources
12. The importance of long cruises and seakeeping
13. The battle for the 1st Salvo
14. The submarine is the basic unit of the Navy
15. The importance of the Strategic Rocket Troops

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
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